Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Ontic structural realism and the interpretation of quantum mechanics

  • Original paper in Philosophy of Physics
  • Published:
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper argues that ontic structural realism (OSR) faces a dilemma: either it remains on the general level of realism with respect to the structure of a given theory, but then it is, like epistemic structural realism, only a partial realism; or it is a complete realism, but then it has to answer the question how the structure of a given theory is implemented, instantiated or realized and thus has to argue for a particular interpretation of the theory in question. This claim is illustrated by examining how OSR fares with respect to the three main candidates for an ontology of quantum mechanics, namely many worlds-type interpretations, collapse-type interpretations and hidden variable-type interpretations. The result is that OSR as such is not sufficient to answer the question of what the world is like if quantum mechanics is correct.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In my earlier publications in favour of OSR (Esfeld 2004 and 2009; Esfeld and Lam 2008 and 2011), I failed to see this point. The present paper corrects my earlier publications in arguing that we have to go beyond OSR in order to achieve a staisfactory scientific realist position in the philosophy of physics.

References

  • Ainsworth, P. M. (2010). What is ontic structural realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41, 50–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ainsworth, P. M. (2011). Ontic structural realism and the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Erkenntnis, 75, 67–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allori, V., Goldstein, S., Tumulka, R., & Zanghi, N. (2008). On the common structure of Bohmian mechanics and the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59, 353–389.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bain, J. (2012). Category-theoretic structure and radical ontic structural realism. Forthcoming in Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9896-6.

  • Barrett, J. A. (1999). The quantum mechanics of minds and worlds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartels, A. (1996). Modern essentialism and the problem of individuation of spacetime points. Erkenntnis, 45, 25–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bell, J. S. (1987). Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Belot, G. (2012). Quantum states for primitive ontologists. A case study. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2, 67–83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bohm, D. (1951). Quantum theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bohm, D. (1952). A suggested interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of ‘hidden’ variables. Physical Review, 85, 166–193.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cao, Tian Yu. (2003). Can we dissolve physical entities into mathematical structure? Synthese, 136, 57–71.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chang, H., & Cartwright, N. (1993). Causality and realism in the EPR experiment. Erkenntnis, 38, 169–190.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dorato, M. (2000). Substantivalism, relationism, and structural spacetime realism. Foundations of Physics, 30, 1605–1628.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dorato, M. (2008). Is structural spacetime realism relationism in disguise? The supererogatory nature of the substantivalism/relationism debate. In D. Dieks (Ed.), The ontology of spacetime II (pp. 17–37). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Dorato, M., & Esfeld, M. (2010). GRW as an ontology of dispositions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41, 41–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dürr, D., Goldstein, S., & Zanghì, N. (2012). Quantum physics without quantum philosophy. Berlin: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., & Rosen, N. (1935). Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete? Physical Review, 47, 777–780.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Esfeld, M. (2004). Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 35, 601–617.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Esfeld, M. (2009). The modal nature of structures in ontic structural realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 23, 179–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Esfeld, M., & Lam, V. (2008). Moderate structural realism about space-time. Synthese, 160, 27–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Esfeld, M., & Lam, V. (2011). Ontic structural realism as a metaphysics of objects. In A. Bokulich & P. Bokulich (Eds.), Scientific structuralism (pp. 143–159). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Everett, H. (1957). Relative state’ formulation of quantum mechanics. Reviews of Modern Physics, 29, 454–462. Reprinted in B. S. DeWitt and N. Graham (eds.) (1973): The many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 141–149

  • Floridi, L. (2008). A defence of informational structural realism. Synthese, 161, 219–253.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • French, S. (2010). The interdependence of structure, objects and dependence. Synthese, 175, 177–197.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • French, S., & Ladyman, J. (2003). Remodelling structural realism: quantum physics and the metaphysics of structure. Synthese, 136, 31–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ghirardi, G. C., Grassi, R., & Benatti, F. (1995). Describing the macroscopic world: closing the circle within the dynamical reduction program. Foundations of Physics, 25, 5–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ghirardi, G. C., Rimini, A., & Weber, T. (1986). Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic systems. Physical Review D, 34, 470–491.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hoefer, C. (1996). The metaphysics of space-time substantivalism. Journal of Philosophy, 93, 5–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ladyman, J. (1998). What is structural realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Science, 29, 409–424.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. (2007). Every thing must go. Metaphysics naturalised. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1986). Philosophical papers. Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (2009). Ramseyan humility. In D. Braddon-Mitchell & R. Nola (Eds.), Conceptual analysis and philosophical naturalism (pp. 203–222). Cambridge (Massachusetts): MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lyre, H. (2010). Humean perspectives on structural realism. In F. Stadler (Ed.), The present situation in the philosophy of science (pp. 381–397). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Lyre, H. (2012). Structural invariants, structural kinds, structural laws. In D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, M. Stöltzner, & M. Weber (Eds.), Probabilities, laws, and structures (pp. 169–181). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Maudlin, T. (1989). The essence of space–time. In A. Fine & J. Leplin (Eds.), Proceedings of the 1988 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Volume 2 (pp. 82–91). East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maudlin, T. (1995). Three measurement problems. Topoi, 14, 7–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morganti, M. (2011). Is there a compelling argument for ontic structural realism? Philosophy of Science, 78, 1165–1176.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Muller, F. A. (2011). Withering away, weakly. Synthese, 180, 223–233.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Price, H. (1996). Time’s arrow and Archimedes’ point. New directions for the physics of time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific realism. How science tracks truth. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Psillos, S. (2006). The structure, the whole structure and nothing but the structure? Philosophy of Science, 73, 560–570.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Psillos, S. (2012). Adding modality to ontic structuralism: an exploration and critique. In E. Landry & D. Rickles (Eds.), Structural realism. Structure, object, and causality (pp. 169–185). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • San Pedro, I. (2012). Causation, measurement relevance and no-conspiracy in EPR. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2, 137–156.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Saunders, S. (2006). Are quantum particles objects? Analysis, 66, 52–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Saunders, S., Barrett, J., Kent, A., & Wallace, D. (Eds.). (2010). Many worlds? Everett, quantum theory, and reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Slowik, E. (2012). On structuralism’s multiple paths through spacetime theories. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2, 45–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suárez, M. (2007). Causal inference in quantum mechanics: a reassessment. In F. Russo & J. Williamson (Eds.), Causality and probability in the sciences. London: London College.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tumulka, R. (2006). A relativistic version of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model. Journal of Statistical Physics, 125, 821–840.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • von Neumann, J. (1932). Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik. Berlin: Springer. English translation: Mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics. Translated by R. T. Beyer. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1955.

  • Wallace, D. (2010). Decoherence and ontology (or: How I learned to stop worrying and love FAPP). In S. Saunders, J. Barrett, A. Kent, & D. Wallace (Eds.), Many worlds? Everett, quantum theory, and reality (pp. 54–72). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Worrall, J. (1989). Structural realism: the best of two worlds? Dialectica, 43, 99–124. Reprinted in D. Papineau (ed.) (1996): The philosophy of science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 139–165.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Michael Esfeld

Authors
  1. Michael Esfeld
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Esfeld.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Esfeld, M. Ontic structural realism and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 3, 19–32 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-012-0054-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-012-0054-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation