Abstract
In recent years a number of authors sympathetic to Referentialistaccounts of proper names have argued that utterances containingempty names express `gappy,' or incomplete, propositions. In this paper I want to take issue with this suggestion.In particular, I argue versions of this approach developedby David Braun, Nathan Salmon, Ken Taylor, and by Fred Adams,Gary Fuller, and Robert Stecker.
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Everett, A. Empty Names and `Gappy' Propositions. Philosophical Studies 116, 1–36 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000005533.25543.36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000005533.25543.36