Journal of the History of Philosophy

Hume, Conjectural History, and the Uniformity of Human Nature SIMON EVNINE 1~ ATTHE BEGINNINGof the nineteenth century, the Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart described a philosophical method, called by him "conjectural history," the use of which he took to be distinctive of the philosophy of the latter half of the eighteenth century. Conjectural history is the practice, "when we are unable to ascertain how men have actually conducted themselves upon particular occasions, of considering in what manner they are likely to have proceeded, from the principles of their nature, and the circumstances of their external situation. ''* The employment of this method Stewart associates with those favorite eighteenth-century topics, the origins and progress of language, government , law, manners, religion, and the arts and sciences.' Along with this method Stewart describes a substantive thesis, which he boldly says has "long been received as an incontrovertible logical maxim," namely: "That the capacities of the human mind have been in all ages the same, and that the diversity of phenomena exhibited by our species is the result merely of the different circumstances in which men are placed."3 We can see why this thesis should be associated with the method of conjectural history. Conjectural history is a kind of triangulation. To conjecture about the progress of some human institution or activity, we have to fix two other ' Dugald Stewart, Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, reprinted in Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. E. G. Wakefield (London: Charles Knight & Co., 1843), Iv. ' Stewart, Dissertation: Exhibiting the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy, since the Revival of Letters in Europe, in Stewart, The Collected Works, ed. Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh : Thomas Constable & Co., 1854), l: 7o. 3Ibid., 69. [589] 59 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 1:4 OCTOBER 1993 points: the external circumstances in which people are likely to have found themselves and human nature, in particular the nature of the human mind, at the relevant time. The method would be of little use if there were no way of ascertaining the nature of the human mind at a time other than through its cultural products, since the state of these cultural products is what is at issue in conjectural history. The simplest way of satisfying this requirement is to hold that the nature of the human mind is constant, since that would mean that we have only to look at ourselves to know what the human mind must have been like in ages past. Hence the method encourages acceptance of the thesis. (I am here only trying to spell out the logical, not the historical, connection between conjectural history and the belief in the uniformity of the capacities of the human mind. Probably, acceptance of the belief preceded, and encouraged, the use of the method.) What we have, then, is a method and an accompanying thesis. Both seem to be relevant to Hume. Stewart explicitly associates the method with Hume. He writes that his term "conjectural history....coincides pretty nearly in its meaning with that of Natural History as employed by Mr Hume," referring to Hume's Natural History of Religion.4 We may, therefore, take this work as an example of conjectural history. In addition, there are many other places, particularly in his short essays, where Hume seems to be engaged in conjectural historical reflection on the arts, the sciences, government and laws. As for the thesis, there are many places where Hume appears to affirm it explicitly. For example, "Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular."5 Another statement comes at the beginning of the essay "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations": In the flourishing age of the world, it may be expected, that the human species should possess greater vigour both of mind and body, more prosperous health, higher spirits, longer life, and a stronger inclination and power of generation. But if the general system of things, and human society of course, have any such gradual revolutions, they are too slow to be discernible in that short period which is comprehended by...