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Notes
Affordances are the terms in which perceptual information is made available.
John Sutton has written a fair bit about how Descartes did allow for this kind of body–brain integration. In Sutton’s view; modern forms of Cartesianism must be intended as deviations from the Magister’s Dictum because they have failed to keep abreast of the spirit of his philosophy. So, Cartesianism would interestingly be not true to the spirit of Descartes! For more specific details, see Sutton (1998) and Gaukroger et al. (2000). Thanks to Julian Kiverstein for the hint.
This seems to provide nice empirical evidence for what Mark Rowlands (1999) has called the “barking dog principle.” “If it is necessary for an organism to be able to perform a given adaptive task T, then it is differentially selectively disadvantageous for that organism to develop internal mechanisms sufficient for the performance of T when it is possible for the organism to perform T by way of a combination of internal mechanisms and manipulation of the external environment” (Rowlands 1999), p.80]. This principle is very similar to the 007 principle formulated by Clark in 1989. It is important to note that the 007 principle has been consistently used, in the literature directed at the extended mind thesis, to endorse the case of cognitive extension. For an interesting analysis of the relationships between the two, see Shapiro 2010.
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Acknowledgments
I am deeply indebted to Julian Kiverstein and John Sutton for their continuous guidance and invaluable support throughout my doctoral studies. My warmest gratitude also goes to Andy Clark and Richard Menary for their stimulating feedback on earlier drafts of this review. Thanks also to Joel Krueger for the precious assistance through the editorial process. Last but not least, I would like to express my appreciation to the ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD) and to Macquarie University for generously financing my research. Needless to say, any remaining errors are mine and mine alone.
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Farina, M. Louise Barrett, beyond the brain: how body and environment shape animal and human minds. Phenom Cogn Sci 11, 415–421 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-9247-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-9247-6