Abstract
A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.
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Farkas, K. Time, tense, truth. Synthese 160, 269–284 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9116-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9116-y