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Development of Norms Through Compliance Disclosure

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Abstract

This article introduces compliance disclosure regimes to business ethics research. Compliance disclosure is a relatively recent regulatory technique whereby companies are obliged to disclose the extent to which they comply with codes, ‘best practice standards’ or other extra-legal texts containing norms or prospective norms. Such ‘compliance disclosure’ obligations are often presented as flexible regulatory alternatives to substantive, command-and-control regulation. However, based on a report on experiences of existing compliance disclosure obligations, this article will identify major weaknesses that prevent them from becoming effective mechanisms to discipline a certain type of behaviour. It will be argued that regulatory recourse to compliance disclosure obligations is nonetheless worthwhile if we view them as mechanisms that can initiate a dialogue about norm interpretation, application and norm desirability. From this perspective, compliance disclosure obligations serve less to discipline companies by making corporate practices transparent, and more to trigger a process of norm development, in which the law, companies and their stakeholders interact. This article provides an illustration of how mandatory disclosure, if it is restricted to a unilateral communication process, may produce no effective results (or even prove counterproductive), whilst highlighting the alternative potential of disclosure as an initiator of dialogue, supported by laws, geared towards the development and refinement of norms applicable to business in a global context and the values they promote.

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Notes

  1. In this article I speak of ‘norm proposal’ when a text defining an ‘ought to’ aspires to become a norm. The existence of a ‘norm’ is assumed when many persons regularly behave in a certain way, and this type of behaviour is approved, and deviant behaviour meets with disapproval from the community to which the person belongs (see Axelrod 1986, p. 1096 et seq.; Pettit 1990, p. 728 et seq.; Donaldson and Dunfee 1994, p. 263 et seq. for different approaches leading to similar definitions of the term “norm”).

  2. In this article I use the term ‘extra-legal’ to depict any norm or norm proposal that cannot be situated within the traditional hierarchy of legal norms issued by a state lawmaker or developed through jurisprudence, where the higher norms legitimize the lower ones with national constitutions and ratified international treaties ranging at the top of this hierarchy. However, by using the term ‘extra-legal’, I do not intend to take a stance on the ‘law without state’ issue relating to the circumstances under which extra-legal norms could be viewed as law (see Parker 2008 for a discussion of this). Nor do I exclude the possibility that a state lawmaker can propose a norm to which a law or a contract makes reference (for the use of the term ‘extra-legal’ applied to corporate governance codes, see also Goulding et al. 2005).

  3. Any person who has access to and is interested in the disclosed information can qualify as a ‘disclosure addressee’—an economic interest is not required. This term is thus wider than the term ‘user’ deployed by Fung et al. (2007), which refers to a person who uses disclosed information to make decisions. If, as can be expected, anybody affected by norm-relevant behaviour is potentially interested in the information that a compliance statement may convey, then disclosure addressees and persons affected by norm-relevant behaviour are (potentially) congruent.

  4. Listing Rule 9.8.6 (6) (FSA 2009) reads: “In the case of a listed company incorporated in the United Kingdom, the following additional items must be included in its annual financial report: […] a statement as to whether the listed company has: (a) complied throughout the accounting period with all relevant provisions set out in Section 1 of the Combined Code; or (b) not complied throughout the accounting period with all relevant provisions set out in Section 1 of the Combined Code and if so, setting out: (i) those provisions, if any, it has not complied with; (ii) in the case of provisions whose requirements are of a continuing nature, the period within which, if any, it did not comply with some or all of those provisions; and (iii) the company’s reasons for non-compliance […].” Section 161 of the German Joint Stock Corporation Act reads (convenience translation): “The executive board and supervisory board of exchange-listed companies shall declare once a year that the recommendations of the ‘Government Commission on the German Corporate Governance Code’ published by the Federal Ministry of Justice in the official section of the electronic Federal Gazette have been and are being complied with, or declare which of the Code’s recommendations are not being applied. The declaration shall be made permanently accessible to stockholders.”

  5. In the European Union, the UK listing rules provide for the furthest reaching mandate of statutory auditors in this respect (see FSA 2009, Listing Rule 9.8.10 (2)). Elsewhere, auditors do not verify more than the proper respect of procedures pertaining to the issuance of the compliance statement; see Fasterling and Duhamel (2009, p. 145 et seq.), Risk Metrics (2009, p. 69 et seq.).

  6. To illustrate the point, MacNeil and Li (2006, p. 488) report that while 47% of their sample companies considered themselves fully compliant with the Combined Code, an independent consulting firm came to a different conclusion and estimated the rate of full compliance to be 34% for the same sample.

  7. The only remedy against this problem would be to adopt far-reaching causality presumptions in favour of plaintiffs that consider any kind of information relevant for stock market prices. Jurisprudence in the United States had introduced such presumptions on the basis of the so-called ‘fraud on the market theory’, but when they faced extensive litigation abuse (see Rodriguez 2000), the US Congress and Supreme Court placed limits on the litigation practice that based claims on the ‘fraud on the market’ jurisprudence (see Fasterling and Duhamel 2009, p. 151 for references to relevant case history).

  8. The dialogue is ‘public’ if the compliance disclosure and disclosure addressee responses are accessible to anyone. It could be questioned whether the fundamental procedural precepts of dialogue are observed if one of the dialoguing parties is coerced to speak, and in the context of this article one might ask whether it is adequate that mandatory law prompts the dialogue. We have seen, however, that under a compliance disclosure regime mandatory law does not specifically mandate dialogue, but only the disclosure of compliance with a proposed norm. Dialogue remains optional and depends on the motivation of disclosers and disclosure addressees to interact with each other.

  9. In the case of ‘comply or explain’ obligations in the EU, varying non-state or public–private bodies have proposed norms that subsequently became points of reference; this prompted debates in some countries. In Germany, for example, some questioned the constitutionality of the legal reference in the German joint stock corporations act to the German corporate governance code that was drafted by a government-appointed commission of experts, arguing that the drafting body did not have sufficient democratic legitimacy to draft a text that would become a point of reference in statutory law (see Hommelhoff and Schwab 2003). French law circumvents this problem by not directly referring to a particular text, but allowing a reference to a certain type of corporate governance code, namely any corporate governance code that is drafted by ‘representative business organisations’, which leads to potential competition between different texts. However, in the French case, it is somewhat disturbing that the most prominent code has been drafted by organisations that in effect represent French businesses, precisely those that are obliged to disclose compliance. The drafting of a code by these organizations and the disclosure of an annual evaluation of the application of their own code (see AFEP and MEDEF 2009) could in itself be viewed as a strategic effort to showcase French corporate governance to international investors.

  10. Duhamel and Fasterling (2009) incidentally reveal wrongful or at least incoherent disclosures in the case of ‘comply or explain’ in France.

  11. A case in point may become the Renault CEO’s executive pay for 2009, which was initially reported by the company at €1.2 m and only belatedly took into account an additional payment of about €8 m by Nissan. The affair prompted certain disclosure addressees to question the integrity of executive pay transparency under ‘comply or explain’ mechanisms and call for a stronger reaction to corporate disclosures (see for example Proxinvest 2011).

  12. See, for example, Ruggie (2007) or Catá Backer (2008) for an account of the failure of the draft ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’.

  13. Dealing with different ranges of adequate regulatory response is a notion that is inspired by Ayres and Braithwaite’s (1992) regulatory pyramid, of which non-compelling, ‘persuasive’ regulatory measures form the basis and the starting point for consideration of regulatory response. To the extent that soft measures are ineffective, Ayres and Braithwaite propose an ‘escalation‘ of regulatory reactions with coercive options forming the top of the pyramid.

  14. In this sense the law’s function could be viewed as ‘responsive’ (see Nonet and Selznick 2009; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Braithewaite 2008 for the concept of ‘responsive law’).

  15. Risk Metrics (2009, p. 186 et seq.) provide an overview of existing legislation in this respect but also note that, to date, shareholders have been passive with regard to compliance disclosures.

  16. For a historic example, see Standard and Poor’s (2004). Standard & Poor’s discontinued its corporate governance rating service in 2005. This rating was overtly designed as a norm proposal, since it sought to ‘serve as a positive discipline and incentive for improvement’ (see Dallas 2004, p. 6).

  17. Janney et al. (2009) provide an analysis of market reactions to adherence to the UNGC, including the effects of failing to complete the annual COP. From the perspective adopted in this article, such research is useful, not to determine the effectiveness of the UNGC as an alternative to substantive regulation, but as a possible indication as to whether disclosure addressees accept the UNGC’s principles as norms for businesses.

  18. One might mention the draft ISO 26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility (International Organization for Standardization 2009), which rejects its use for regulatory or contractual purposes. However, the wording of ISO 26000 is not fully clear on the question of whether it would at least accept to become a reference point for legal disclosure; see International Organization for Standardization (2009, lines 233–241). This rejection is interesting: while the objective is to separate the spheres of law and extra-legal norms (the ISO 26000 standard is designed to provide guidance about responsibilities that go ‘beyond the legal compliance’), it acknowledges the possibility that such a text may in fact evolve into a legally relevant standard, because otherwise there would have been no need to include a clarification in the text that emphasises the legal non-relevance of the Guidance.

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Acknowledgements

This article is a part of a joint research project dealing with the theme ‘Transparency and Information Disclosure in Corporate Governance’. The multidisciplinary project is funded by the French National Research Agency (ANR Contract 07-ENTR-012). This project brings together research teams from LegalEDHEC (EDHEC Business School); CRDP-LERADP (University of Lille 2) and EQUIPPE (University of Lille 1). I thank my colleagues Catherine Refait-Alexandre and Jean-Christophe Duhamel with whom I have been working closely on the aforementioned project. This article also benefited from the conversations that I had with the participants of the EBEN Annual Conference 2010 in Trento. Finally, I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for the care with which they reviewed the original manuscript and for their suggestions that helped improving the article.

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    Björn Fasterling

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Fasterling, B. Development of Norms Through Compliance Disclosure. J Bus Ethics 106, 73–87 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-1055-y

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