Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Empathy, Emotional Sharing and Feelings in Stein’s Early Work

  • Theoretical / Philosophical Paper
  • Published:
Human Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper is devoted to the study of the emotions in Edith Stein’s early work On the Problem of Empathy. After presenting her work embedded in the tradition of the early phenomenology of the emotions, I shall elaborate the four dimensions of the emotional experience according to this authoress (depth, reach, duration and intensity), the link between emotions and values and the phenomenon of the living body. I argue that Stein’s account on empathy remains incomplete as long as we ignore the complex phenomenology of emotions underlying her work.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This book contains the two treatises: “Sentient Causality” and “Individual and Community” (Stein 2000).

  2. For an overview of different theories of mind reading in the current debate, including some similarities with early phenomenological theories, see Jensen and Moran (2012).

  3. Like Husserl and Scheler, Stein defends a direct perception account about knowledge of other minds but despite of the similarities among these phenomenological accounts there are also strong differences between them. See for a detailed discussion about the various phenomenological approaches to empathy and its actuality Zahavi (2008, 2010, 2014) and also Jensen and Moran (2012: 127). For an overview of current theories of empathy, see Coplan and Goldie (2011).

  4. Coplan discusses this self-oriented and other-oriented perspective-taking (Coplan 2011: 9–15).

  5. Stein does not mention in her text explicitly that empathy is limited to affective phenomena and some authors suggest that empathy, according to Stein, can indeed be directed also to theoretical acts (Moran 2004: 302; Szanto 2015).

  6. In this point early phenomenologists follow and modify Brentano’s classification of the mental phenomena. In his Psychology Brentano states three kinds of “mental acts”: the first class is constituted by presentations, the second by beliefs and the third one called “love and hate” includes a very range of affective phenomena like emotions, tendencies, interests, feelings, desires, and volitions Stumpf and Husserl will criticize this classification and argue for a division of the third class in “emotions” and “desires”. Stein like all the other early phenomenologists will follow this modification.

  7. For a similar discussion in Scheler, see Schloßberger (2005).

  8. Also in Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities play feelings, emotions, and moods a crucial role in the constitution of the human being (Stein 2000: 75 and 227).

  9. “Emotional sharing” should be understood here in a broad sense and not as fellow-feeling or in some more robust way as literally partaking the same feeling or sharing the same toke of a feeling.

  10. In my opinion, “isomorphism” is not necessary for empathy since are able to have access to the psychic life of other individuals and have an experience of a foreign consciousness without having “the same” mental state. However, it seems to me that the mental state which arises after the act of empathy must be “congruent” with the mental state of the target, i.e., it has to be qualitatively similar. See for a similar view: Preston and de Waal (2002).

  11. See for a different interpretation: Dullstein (2013).

  12. Most work of current authors within the “new” paradigm of “affective intentionality” shows clear signs of crypto-influence by early phenomenological thinkers of the emotions.

  13. A similar testimony can be found in Katz (1972).

  14. I employ the term constellation in the sense developed by Henrich (1992). MacIntyre (2006), in his intellectual biography of Stein, also remarks on the importance of studying her work as embedded in its socio-historical context.

  15. See for recent overviews of the early phenomenological accounts on feelings, see Vendrell Ferran (2008), Caminada (2014), Salice (2015) and Szanto (2015).

  16. In fact, there are two possible ways of understanding the phenomenological method: in transcendental idealism there is a turn to the subject, while in phenomenological realism the turn is towards the object. Both are legitimate ways of understanding phenomenology (Geiger 1933: 15).

  17. Stein establishes a parallelism between the Schelerian model and Pfänder’s analogous idea of a “voluminous self” and the “I-Center”. On Pfänder’s model, the I-Center has the role of a spectator, with limited power and influence over feelings and other motions that arise in the different parts of the ‘self’: it can perceive them, but it cannot fully control them. All the acts of the ‘I-Center’, hence, are embedded in a broader structure of the self that functions as background. A similar parallelism can be found in Walther (1923: 60). See for a detailed analysis of Pfänder’s theory: Vendrell Ferran (2015).

  18. For a detailed account of Stein’s theory of values see Lebech (2009: 257–274).

  19. See Tim Crane for similar claims regarding Brentano, Searle, and Sartre (Crane 1998).

  20. Similar arguments have been developed by Mulligan (2009), in support of Scheler’s distinction between feeling and the feelings.

  21. Husserl, under Stein’s influence, was progressively interested in the phenomenon of the living body (MacIntyre 2006; Zahavi 2014).

  22. Stein elaborates this distinction following Husserl. See Vendrell Ferran (2008:176).

References

  • Brentano, F. (1925). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Leipzig: Meiner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caminada, E. (2014). Joining the background: Habitual sentiments behind we-intentionality. In A. Konzelmann-Ziv & H.-B. Schmid (Eds.), Institutions, emotions, and group agents (pp. 195–212). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P. M. (1991). Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior. In J. D. Greenwood (Ed.), The future of folk psychology (pp. 51–69). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Colombetti, G. (2014). The feeling body: Affective science meets the enactive mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Coplan, A. (2011). Understanding empathy: Its features and effects. In A. Coplan & P. Goldie (Eds.), Empathy. Philosophical and psychological perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Coplan, A., & Goldie, P. (2011). Empathy. Philosophical and psychological perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Crane, T. (1998). Intentionality as the mark of the mental. In A. O’Hear (Ed.), Contemporary issues in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Sousa, R. (1987). The rationality of emotion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Vignemont, F., & Jacob, P. (2012). What is like to feel another’s pain? Philosophy of Science, 79(2), 295–316.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dullstein, M. (2013). Direct perception and simulation: Stein’s account of empathy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(2), 333–350.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elster, J. (1999). Alchemies of the mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Geiger, M. (1933). Alexander Pfänders methodische Stellung. In E. Heller & F. Löw (Eds.), Neue Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen (pp. 1–16). Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth.

  • Goldie, P. (2002). The emotions. A philosophical exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Greenspan, P. (1980). A case of mixed feelings: Ambivalence and the logic of emotion. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), Explaining emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Henrich, D. (1992). Konstellationen. Probleme und Debatten am Ursprung der idealistischen Philosophie (1789–1795). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jacob, P. (2011). The direct-perception model of empathy: A critique. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 519–540.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, R. T., & Moran, D. (2012). Introduction: intersubjectivity and empathy. Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 125–133.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnston, M. (2001). The authority of affect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(1), 181–214.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Katz, R. (1972). Rosa Katz. In L. J. Pongratz, W. Traxel, & E. G. Wehner (Eds.), Psychologie in Selbstdarstellungen. Bern: Huber.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kenny, A. (1963). Action, emotion and will. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kolnai, A. (2007). Ekel, Hochmut, Hass: Zur Phänomenologie feindlicher Gefühle. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lebech, M. (2009). On the problem of human dignity. A hermeneutical and phenomenological investigation. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacIntyre, A. (2006). Edith Stein. A philosophical prologue. London: Continuum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marks, J. (1982). A theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies, 42(1), 227–242.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moran, D. (2004). The problem of empathy: Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein. In T. Kelly & P. Roseman (Eds.,) Amor Amicitiae: On the love that is friendship. Essays in medieval thought and beyond in honor of the Rev. Professor James McEvoy. Leuven: Peeters.

  • Mulligan, K. (1998). The spectre of inverted emotions and the space of emotions. In Acta analytica (pp. 89–105).

  • Mulligan, K. (2009). On being struck by value. In B. Merker (Ed.), Leben mit Gefühlen. Paderborn: Mentis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nussbaum, M. (2005). The upheavals of thought. The intelligence of emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pfänder, A. (1913/16). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung I, 325–404 and III, 1–125. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.

  • Preston, S. D., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2002). Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. Behavioral and brain sciences, 25, 1–72.

  • Prinz, J. (2003). Emotions embodied. In R. Solomon (Ed.), Thinking about feeling. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pugmire, D. (2005). Sound sentiments: Integrity in the emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Salice, A. (2015). Love and other social stances in early Phenomenology. In D. Moran & T. Szanto (Eds.,) Discovering the “We”. London: Routledge.

  • Scheler, M. (1973). Formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics of values. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schloßberger, M. (2005). Die Erfahrung des Anderen: Gefühle im menschlichen Miteinander. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Schmitz, H. (1981). System der Philosophie, III (Vol. 2). Bonn: Bouvier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Solomon, R. C. (1993). The passions: Emotions and the meaning of life. Indianapolis: Hackett.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stein, E. (1986). Life in a Jewish family: Her unfinished autobiographical account. Washington: ICS Publications.

  • Stein, E. (1989). On the problem of empathy: The collected works of Edith Stein. Washington: ICS Publications.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Stein, E. (2000). Philosophy of psychology and the humanities. Washington: ICS Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stocker, M. (1987). Emotional thoughts. American Philosophical Quarterly, 24(1), 59–69.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stumpf, C. (1928). Gefühl und Gefühlsempfindung. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Szanto, T. (2015). Shared emotions and collective empathy: A Steinian account.

  • Tappolet, C. (2000). Émotions et Valeurs. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, G. (1985). Pride, Shame and Guilt. Emotions of self-assessment. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Titchener, E. B. (1980). Textbook of Psychology. New York: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints.

  • Vendrell Ferran, Í. (2008). Die Emotionen. Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vendrell Ferran, Í. (2015). Affective intentionality: Early phenomenological contributions to a new phenomenological sociology. In D. Moran & T. Szanto (Eds.,) Discovering the “We”. London: Routledge.

  • Walther, G. (1923). Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften. In: Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Vol. VI, pp. 1–158). Halle: Niemeyer.

  • Wollheim, R. (1999). Emotionen. Eine Philosophie der Gefühle. München: C.H. Beck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wundt, W. (1920). Grundriss der Psychologie. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (2001). Beyond empathy. Phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5–7), 151–167.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (2008). Simulation, projection and empathy. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 514–522.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (2010). Empathy, embodiment and interpersonal understanding: From Lipps to Schutz. Inquiry, 53(3), 285–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (2011). Empathy and direct social perception: A phenomenological proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(3), 541–558.

  • Zahavi, D. (2014). Empathy and other-directed intentionality. Topoi, 33(1), 129–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Institut für Philosophie, Zwätzengasse 9, 07743, Jena, Germany

    Íngrid Vendrell Ferran

Authors
  1. Íngrid Vendrell Ferran
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Íngrid Vendrell Ferran.

Additional information

This paper is submitted to “Human Studies” as a commissioned paper for the Special Issue “Empathy and Collective Intentionality. The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein.” (Guest Editors: Thomas Szanto and Dermot Moran).

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Vendrell Ferran, Í. Empathy, Emotional Sharing and Feelings in Stein’s Early Work. Hum Stud 38, 481–502 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-015-9346-4

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-015-9346-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation