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Isaiah Berlin: Liberalism and pluralism in theory and practice

  • Feature Article: Political Theory Revisited
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Contemporary Political Theory Aims and scope

Abstract

One of the most pressing dilemmas of the moment concerns pluralism and the issue of justification: how does one defend a commitment to any particular position? The fear is that pluralism undercuts our ability to justify our moral and political views, and thereby leads to relativism. As I argue here, Isaiah Berlin provides an exemplary argument concerning the ties between pluralism and liberalism. Although Berlin admits there is no logical link between pluralism and liberalism, he nevertheless highlights plausible ties between pluralism and the fields of philosophy, history and politics, all of which provide good reasons for him to endorse liberalism. Moreover, these arguments indicate how pluralism differs from relativism, so that pluralists such as Berlin are not guilty of the charge of moral subjectivism. A reconsideration of Berlin's position thus provides insight into the problem of justification in a pluralist condition, one that illuminates certain features of pluralism, as well as exemplifies its compatibility with liberalism.

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Notes

  1. For a sample of the various ways Berlin's thought inspired other thinkers see: Crowder (2002); Galston (2002, p. 4f.); Gray (2000, p. 85f., 2006, pp. 20–22); Kekes (1993, pp. 12, 60, 93–98); Rorty (1989, p. 45f.); and Shklar (1989, pp. 28–29).

  2. ‘ … the nature of philosophical problems … is that they are precisely those problems which are not soluble by the application of ready-made techniques, precisely those questions which puzzle and oppress because they cannot be dealt with by the techniques so successful in the sciences or elsewhere …’ (Berlin, 1996a, p. 9).

  3. The advent of a particular approach to philosophy, which tries to abolish questions rather than answer them is addressed by Berlin in ‘Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century’. See: Berlin, 2002b, 75f.

  4. Other liberals express concerns similar to Rawls about what is basically the idea of neutrality; that is, the idea that the state should not impinge upon individual's beliefs. Although the details of their discussion may differ, the basic idea is the same: a liberal state should not evaluate competing moral positions. Rawls, however, provides an especially good instance of such arguments; hence I have fastened upon his for purposes of comparison with Berlin. Still, similar comparisons could be made with Bruce Ackerman; Ronald Dworkin; Will Kymlicka; Charles Larmore; and Robert Nozick – although doing so would go well beyond the confines of the present discussion. See: Nozick (1974); Ackerman (1980); Dworkin (1985); Larmore (1987); and Kymlicka (1989).

  5. This is not to suggest that Berlin's position is without complications. It is one thing to assert the falsity of Nazism, another to evaluate the truthfulness of Conservatism, Socialism and similar positions. It is not clear, for example, how one could demonstrably verify Republicanism, or falsify Conservatism. There is clearly a form of empiricism underlying Berlin's argument, although it is unclear how he would develop this. As it stands, his claims exhibit a rudimentary ‘correspondence theory’ of epistemology (that truth is predicated upon beliefs corresponding to an objective reality), a position that has historically proven difficult to defend. Still, Berlin prompts a type of foundational reflection about politics that is contrary to many trends in political theory today.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Raia Prokhovnik and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on early versions of this paper.

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  1. Department of Political Science, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, QC H3A 2T7, Canada

    Jason Ferrell

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Ferrell, J. Isaiah Berlin: Liberalism and pluralism in theory and practice. Contemp Polit Theory 8, 295–316 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2009.2

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