Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox

  • FERNÁNDEZ J
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Abstract

I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solutionto Moore's paradox. First, I distinguish two versions ofthe paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither ofwhich solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I proposea model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have acertain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I haveit on the basis of the very evidence that grounds myfirst-order belief. Then, I argue that the model inquestion can account for both versions of Moore's paradox.Moore's paradox, I conclude, tells us something about ourconceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For itteaches us that we take it to be constitutive of beingrational that one can have privileged access to one's ownmind and it reveals that having privileged access to one'sown mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs andcorresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis.

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FERNÁNDEZ, J. (2005). Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore’s Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71(3), 533–556. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00470.x

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