Abstract
This paper provides a possible worlds semantics for the system of the author's previous paper ‘The Logic of Essence’. The basic idea behind the semantics is that a statement should be taken to be true in virtue of the nature of certain objects just in case it is true in any possible world compatible with the nature of those objects. It is shown that a slight variant of the original system is sound and complete under the proposed semantics.
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References
Correia, F. (2000): A propositional logic of essence, to appear in J. Philos. Logic.
Fine, K. (1994): Essence and modality, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspective 8, pp. 1-16, reprinted in Philosopher's Annual, 1994.
Fine, K. (1995): Senses of essence, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Modality, Morality and Belief, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 53-77.
Fine, K. (1995): The logic of essence, J. Philos. Logic 24, 241-273.
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Fine, K. Semantics for the Logic of Essence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29, 543–584 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026591900038
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026591900038