Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry FrankfurtSarah Buss, Lee Overton The original essays in this book address Harry Frankfurt's influential writing on personal identity, love, value, moral responsibility, and the freedom and limits of the human will. Many of Frankfurt's deepest insights come from exploring the self-reflective nature of human agents and the psychic conflicts that self-reflection often produces. His work has informed discussions in metaphysics, metaethics, normative ethics, and action theory. The authors, recognized for their own contributions to the understanding of human agency, defend their original philosophical positions at the same time that they respond to Frankfurt's. Each essay is followed by a response from Frankfurt, in which he clarifies and elaborates on his views. |
Contents
FrankfurtStyle Compatibilism | 1 |
Control and Causal Determinism | 33 |
Reply to Eleonore Stump | 61 |
Reply to Michael E Bratman | 86 |
Volitional Necessities | 129 |
Reasons and Passions | 165 |
Ambiguities of Activity in Mental | 189 |
Frankfurts Avoidance | 227 |
Reply to Susan Wolf | 245 |
Other editions - View all
The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt Sarah Buss,Lee Overton No preview available - 2002 |
The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt Sarah Buss,Lee Overton No preview available - 2002 |
Common terms and phrases
action activity actual sequence agency agent alien alternative possibilities ambivalence argue argument autonomy behavior believe bootstrapping Bratman bullshit Cambridge University Press caring Cartesian dualism causal determinism claim commitment compatibilist conception concern David Robb decision deliberative determinism is true discussion distinction Eleonore Stump endorsement essay example external fact feel first-order desire Fischer and Ravizza Frankfurt-type Frankfurt's account Freedom functioning Harry Frankfurt higher-order attitudes higher-order volitions human Ibid idea identification identity important incapacity incompatibilism intention involve judgment Judith Kane kind manipulation matter means mechanism mental Michael Bratman moral responsibility motives neural normative notion object one's oneself Oxford particular passive person Peter van Inwagen Philosophical Pinsk pleasure practical reasoning principle question rational reasons-responsive reflection relation relevant requires respect rules out moral second-order desires seems sense simply someone sort suggests suppose things thought tion treating truth unclarifiable understand Velleman volitional necessity wholeheartedness