The Journal of Speculative Philosophy

1. Introduction

Similarities between pragmatist models of democracy and deliberative models have been explored over recent years, most notably in this journal (Talisse 2004). However, the work of Iris Marion Young has, thus far, not figured in such comparative analyses and historical weighing of pragmatist antecedents in deliberativist work.¹ In what follows, I wish to redress this oversight by placing Young in conversation with John Dewey and Jane Addams. Young's particular brand of deliberative theorizing focuses on the inclusion of women and all those deemed Other in our democracies. She identifies a significant shortcoming in standard expositions of deliberative thought, pointing out that communicative style, structured by oppressive norms of gender, race, and class, to name but a few, may serve to undermine our full participation in political decision making. While this forms a valuable insight for those seeking to redress the exclusion of Others in democracies, it also draws attention to the centrality of differences of communication in deliberative settings.

In what follows, I will highlight the integral role played by communication in Young's and Dewey's expositions of democracy while showing that [End Page 497] Addams foreshadows Young's principal insight through an appreciation of communicative difference and its attendant political implications. The article will begin with an outline of the key differences between aggregative and deliberative theories, followed by a comparative analysis of Young's and Dewey's respective models of democracy, and will issue in a discussion of Addams's sensitivity to diverse communicative styles. By proceeding in this manner, I wish to shed light on the political theories of each of the philosophers explored here while proffering a more nuanced reading of how democracies might become inclusive of all those traditionally marginalized in political democratic processes.

2. Aggregative Versus Deliberative Democracy

In Inclusion and Democracy, Young (2002) outlines the shortcomings of aggregative interpretations of democracy and juxtaposes these to the advances posed by deliberative models.² She notes that aggregative accounts focus on the compiling of citizens' preferences, and policy makers tailor their political actions to the most widely held preferences of the electorate. Young problematizes the straightforward adoption of preferences at face value, though, and questions how we come to hold said preferences in the first place. Accordingly, preferences need not always be arrived at through a process of careful reflection and reasoning, as there "are no criteria for distinguishing the quality of preferences by either content, origin or motive" in aggregative systems (Young 2002, 20). Also, preference aggregation tells us nothing about how preferences are changed, as preferences are abstracted from people's lives. Indeed, the very idea of transformation in preferences is undermined, since "citizens never need to leave the private realm of their own interests and preferences to interact with those whose preferences differ. . . . [T]here is no account of the possibility of political co-ordination and co-operation" (Young 2002, 20).

Added to this is the lack of means to evaluate preferences, as the most widely held subjective opinions hold sway without any due regard for moral objectivity. Thus, aggregative democracy, which assumes all moral claims to be equally subjective, diminishes the legitimacy of political processes for minority preference-holders. As Young explains, "There is no reason why those who do not share those [majority] preferences ought to abide by the results. They may simply feel that they have no choice but to submit, given [End Page 498] that they are in the minority" (2002, 21). The aggregative model thereby alienates those members of a society who do not see their political preferences reflected in the political machinery and who therefore reject its efficacy and nonarbitrariness.

In contrast to aggregative democracy, the deliberative model places citizens' participation at the very center of decision making, with political problems being discussed collectively in search for the best possible solutions to the question at hand. Rather than taking the maximization of preferences as the determinant for policy and political action, suggestions for how to proceed are thrashed out with other deliberators, who must ground their arguments by proffering the best reasons for the resolution to political problems (Young 2002...