A theory of the child's theory of mind
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Cited by (363)
Neural correlates of theory of mind reasoning in congenitally blind children
2023, Developmental Cognitive NeuroscienceTheory of mind and executive function in early childhood: A cross-cultural investigation
2022, Cognitive DevelopmentHow children's social tendencies can shape their theory of mind development: Access and attention to social information
2021, Developmental ReviewCitation Excerpt :As noted earlier, there are diverse perspectives on the nature of ToM development, and findings of the reviewed work have implications for arbitrating between these perspectives. In contrast to the constructivist perspectives of social-cognitive development that we have endorsed in this paper (for which children build new concepts as they negotiate their existing ideas with information gained through social interaction and observation), other scholars endorse nativist perspectives, according to which children are born with foundational knowledge about the psychological world (although the proposed richness of that knowledge varies by theorist; e.g., Fodor, 1992; Scholl & Leslie, 1999). One type of argument is that very young children (perhaps even infants) possess much more sophisticated ToM capacities than they are given credit for, but that children are not afforded the opportunity to demonstrate those capacities given the cognitive demands of certain ToM tasks (particularly false-belief tasks) or because children do not yet possess the language needed to respond appropriately on ToM tasks (for reviews, see Devine & Hughes, 2014; Meltzoff, 2002).
Working memory load impairs tacit coordination but not inter-brain EEG synchronization
2024, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
I am indebted to philosophy and psychology graduate students at Rutgers for discussion of these ideas and for suggesting some of the experimental designs proposed in the Appendix. Special thanks to Luca Bonatti and Shawn Nichols.