My purpose here is to undercut rorty's critique of "the privacy objection" to the mind-body identity theory. central to his critique is his argument that in the case of introspective reports, we need to and can distinguish misnaming from misjudging only if we have "public" criteria for the proper use of introspective vocabulary. i grant rorty this much, but argue that this concession does "not" pose a problem for "the privacy objection." he supposes otherwise, i argue, because he "inflates" the character of the public criteria we have/need in order to operate within such introspective contexts.
CITATION STYLE
Fowler, C. (2015). Rorty’s Critique Of The Privacy Objection To The Identity Theory. Auslegung: A Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.17161/ajp.1808.8918
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