Abstract
In Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs, Lisa Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of delusions is no barrier to their being classified as beliefs. This comment asks how Bortolotti’s position may be affected if we accept that there are two distinct types of belief, belonging to different levels of mentality and subject to different ascriptive constraints. It addresses some worries Bortolotti has expressed about the proposed two-level framework and outlines some questions that arise for her if the framework is adopted. It also suggests that, rather than being beliefs that fail to meet the relevant standards of rationality, delusions may be non-doxastic acceptances that were never meant to meet them.
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Notes
She writes ‘one can express conviction in the endorsement of the content of the belief to different extent’ ([12], p.12)
Schwitzgebel does not distinguish levels of belief, and some of the cases he would describe as ones of in-between belief, I would describe as cases of belief at one level only. I am suggesting here that there may be cases of in-between belief within each level.
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Frankish, K. Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-doxastic Acceptances. Neuroethics 5, 23–27 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-011-9123-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-011-9123-7