Journal of the History of Philosophy

BOOK REVIEWS 241 think, including how he ought to think qua self-thinker. Thus it is the Logic which provides the context for the ordering and unification of all cognition and expands upon the notion of human freedom as the organizing principle for theoretical activity. Finally, the translation itself is quite good. By and large the philosophical terminology is well chosen and justifiable--surely an improvement over the unsystematic (and incomplete) Abbott translation which, as Hartman and Schwarz note, often renders the same German technical term by different English words, thus making Kant appear less consistent than he is. Yet they do not go to the opposite extreme and insist upon an expanded list of standard equivalences which obscure contextual differences and shifts in meaning. Translators are familiar with this particular Scylla and Charybdis and will appreciate the safe passage with Hartman and Schwarz. Nevertheless, the translation is not flawless. In the first place, there are some decisions, announced matter-of-factly in the "Note on Translation," which could use justification. For example, we are told that for Vorstellung "'Presentation' is preferable to 'representation', repraesentatio notwithstanding," without any indication of why it is preferable and what philosophical issues are involved. Is it that "representation" implies a "double affection" theory, as in Adickes's interpretation? Are there obvious reasons for ruling this out? Can the translators identify some widespread and persistent misunderstanding which has led so many translators, from Norman Kemp Smith to Henry Allison, to choose "representation "? Second, there are occasional inconsistencies. After resolving to translate the generic use of Schluss as "conclusion" (rather than "inference"), they translate the title of the entire section on Schliissen as "Of Inferences." Third, the translators rarely note the original German term, and the corresponding page numbers of the Akademie edition of Kant's works are not given in the margin. However, even after these reservations have been stated, the translation remains an accurate and systematic one. THOMAS AUXTER University of Florida G. W F Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom. By Stanley Rosen. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974. Pp. xxi + 302. $12.50) Were I to judge Rosen's exposition of Hegel in terms of his own standard, that it is "primarily for the English speaking philosopher with little or no knowledge of Hegel" (p. xi), I should judge it mostly a failure. And, indeed, even for a philosopher with knowledge of Hegel, it is by no means an unqualified success. The work suffers from infuriating faults. These faults I shall dispense with first, in part to put the reader off (as I think he should be), but in part to acknowledge that the qualified success of Rosen's analysis deserves the ultimate or at least the penultimate word. One fault is Rosen's often murky style. Take this unpropitious sentence on Fichte as by no means exceptional: "The pure spontaneous activity of the self-conscious synthetic unity of apperception takes the original (self-concealing) form (= image) of a reciprocally determining ego and non-ego, the borders of which vary from case to case" (p. 102). Combine the murky style with Rosen's tendency merely to touch on themes, and we have the following paragraph as representative of a weakness frequent to Rosen's explication, especially of Hegel's Phenomenology. We start with a fairly straightforward statement and then, helter skelter, go on and on. Were this a summary passage it might be acceptable, but it constitutes part of the substance of Rosen's analysis. As such it can satisfy neither the philosopher who has knowledge of Hegel nor the philosopher who has little or none. The former will recognize the themes in the Phenomenology but will long for the more elaborate and careful Hegelian exposition which gives them significance. The latter, I suspect, will conclude that Hegel is absurd. 242 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Stoic identifies his interior daydreaming with the Whole. This Whole, however, is at once solipsistic and contradicted by the dreams of other solipsists.The Stoic, in asserting or "positing" himself, at once negates himself. He splits apart like an unstable atom into a multiplicity of equal duplications of the original Whole, and the result is...