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Non-strict ordinal 2 × 2 games: A comprehensive computer-assisted analysis of the 726 possibilities

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Abstract

Game theory has provided many tools for the study of social conflict. The 2 × 2 game has been found to be a particularly useful model. This paper describes the enumeration and analysis of all 726 distinct 2 × 2 games. A computer is used to generate the complete set, and a wide variety of maximin, equilibrium and stability calculations is performed for each player for every outcome in every game. The resulting data set is of great value for both the modeling and analysis of social conflict.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, N2L 3C5, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    D. Marc Kilgour

  2. Department of Management Sciences, University of Waterloo, N2L 3G1, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    Niall M. Fraser

Authors
  1. Niall M. Fraser
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  2. D. Marc Kilgour
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Fraser, N.M., Kilgour, D.M. Non-strict ordinal 2 × 2 games: A comprehensive computer-assisted analysis of the 726 possibilities. Theor Decis 20, 99–121 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135087

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