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Notes
I shall use “goodness” to mean “intrinsic goodness.”
See, e.g., P. A. Schilpp, ed.,The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1942), pp. 57–62, 581–92; W. D. Ross,The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. 87, 114-22.
The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, pp. 62–65.
This is not a tautology. A characteristic may be indefinable (and therefore indefinable in natural terms) and yet be natural, as yellow is according to Moore.
M. E. Clarke, “Valuing and the Quality of Value,”Journal of Philosophy, 35:10 (1938).
See Moore,Philosophical Studies (London: Kegan Paul, 1922), pp. 253-75, and W. D. Ross,The Right and the Good.
Cf. the example of yellow.
The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, pp. 591-92, 605-6. He seems also to hold that goodness is intrinsic, resultant, and nonempirical, pp. 588, 592.
For his definition of an ought-implying property, see pp. 603 ff.
The Definition of Good (New York: MacMillan, 1947), chap. 2, especially pp. 74–75.
Philosophical Review, 59:481-92 (1948).
See pp. 43–44.
It should be noted that many metaphysical idealists and theists are naturalists about intrinsic value in the sense of that term which is here in question.
Logic and the Basis of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p. vii.
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Frankena, W.K. Some arguments for non-naturalism about intrinsic value. Philos Stud 1, 56–60 (1950). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02216991
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02216991