This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
REFERENCES
Boyd, R. 1980, 'Materialism Without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail', in N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), pp. 67–106.
Crane, T. and Mellor, A. 1990, 'There is No Question of Physicalism', Mind 99, pp. 185–206.
Davidson, D. 1970, 'Mental Events', in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press), pp. 79–101. Reprinted in Davidson (1980), Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 207–225.
Davidson, D. 1975, 'Thought and Talk', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 7–23. Reprinted in Davidson (1984) Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Fodor, J. 1974, 'Special Sciences, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis', Synthese 28, pp. 97–115.
Jack, A. 1994, 'Materialism and Supervenience” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, pp. 426–444.
Kim, J. 1984(a), 'Concepts of Supervenience', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45, pp. 153–176.
Kim, J. 1984(b), 'Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9, pp. 257–270.
Kim, J. 1987, '“Strong” and “Global” Supervenience Revisited', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48, pp. 315–326.
Kim, J. 1989, 'The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63, pp. 31–47.
Kim, J. 1990, 'Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept', Metaphilosophy 21, pp. 1–27.
Kim, J. 1992, 'Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, pp. 1–26.
Kim, J. 1993(a), 'The Nonreductivist's Troubles with Mental Causation', in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 189–210.
Kim, J. 1993(b), 'Postscripts on Supervenience', in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 161–171.
Moser, P. 1992, 'Physicalism and Global Supervenience', The Southern Journal of Philosophy 30, pp. 71–82.
Nagel, T. 1974, 'What Is It Like To Be a Bat?', Philosophical Review 83, pp. 435–450.
Putnam, H. 1967, 'Psychological Predicates', in Capitan and Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind and Religion (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), pp. 37–48. Reprinted as 'The Nature of Mental States', in Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 429–440.
Putnam, H. 1975, 'Philosophy and Our Mental Life', in Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 291–303.
Richardson, R. 1979, 'Functionalism and Reductionism', Philosophy of Science 46, pp. 533–558.
Searle, J. 1992, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Teller, P. 1986, 'Relational Holism and Quantum Mechanics', The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37, pp. 71–81.
Van Gulick, R. 1992, 'Nonreductive Materialism and the Nature of Intertheoretic Constraint', in A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim(eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), pp. 157–178.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Francescotti, R.M. The Non-Reductionist's Troubles with Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 89, 105–124 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004273009713
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004273009713