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Le perfectionnisme à l’épreuve du pragmatisme

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2011

Roberto Frega
Roberto Frega*
Affiliation:
Università di Bologna
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I first lay out a definition of perfectionism drawing mainly upon the works of Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell. Secondly, I introduce the notion of “expressive rationality” and show how it contributes to expanding the scope of pragmatism beyond its original boundaries. I then proceed to examine pragmatism and perfectionism as competing alternative accounts of moral experience, through a discussion of Coetzee’s novel The Lives of Animals. In so doing, I intend to show that pragmatism and perfectionism constitute two necessary and irreducible approaches to moral experience, pointing towards two diverging and yet irreducibly joined spheres of moral life.

RÉSUMÉ : Cet article commence par proposer une définition du perfectionnisme inspirée en grande partie des travaux de Cora Diamond et Stanley Cavell. J’introduis ensuite l’idée de «rationalité expressive» et je montre comment elle contribue à étendre la portée du pragmatisme au-delà de ses frontières originales. Je fais enfin l’examen du pragmatisme et du perfectionnisme comme offrant des explications concurrentes de l’expérience morale en m’appuyant sur une discussion du roman The Lives of Animals de Coetzee. J’entends ainsi montrer que perfectionnisme et pragmatisme, loin de proposer deux philosophies éthiques irréconciliables, expriment deux exigences en même temps distinctes et irréductibles de la pensée éthique.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 50 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 1 - 22
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2011

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References

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