De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
The Good Bishop and the Explanation of Political
Authority
Danny Frederick
A central problem of political philosophy is that of explaining how a
state could have the moral authority to enforce laws, promulgate laws
which citizens are thereby obliged to obey, give new duties to citizens
and levy taxes. Many rival solutions to this problem of political
authority have been offered by contemporary and recent philosophers
but none has obtained wide acceptance. The current debate takes no
cognisance of George Berkeley’s ‘Passive Obedience’, in which he
defends the exceptionless duty of not using force to resist the state and
offers a rule-consequentialist account of morality which indicates an
explanation of political authority as grounded in the social
connectedness of human beings. I expound, criticise and develop
Berkeley’s explanation to provide a promising solution to the problem of
political authority. The solution impugns the political authority of all
existing states as well as the duty of passive obedience.
Introduction
A central question of political philosophy concerns the moral legitimacy of the state. Any
body with sufficient power can issue directives accompanied by credible threats of
adverse consequences in case of non-compliance that make it prudent for people to
comply with the directives. But how could a body be morally entitled to:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
enforce laws across the whole of a society,
issue new laws which people thereby have a duty to obey,
assign new moral duties to the citizens,
levy taxes?
That is, how is it possible for a body to have political authority?1 In the course of his
defence of passive obedience to the state, George Berkeley, ‘the good bishop’, suggests a
theological rule-consequentialist explanation of the moral authority of the state which, if
The term ‘political authority’ is sometimes used to refer only to (2) and (3), for instance by David
Estlund, Democratic Authority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 2; but here I use the
term more loosely to cover (1) - (4).
1
23
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
developed and corrected, provides a promising solution to the problem of political
authority.2 Unfortunately, Berkeley’s approach to the problem has been ignored by
contemporary and recent philosophers. For example, four recent encyclopaedia articles
which review the state of the current debate about the problem of political authority say
nothing of either Berkeley or a rule-consequentialist solution.3 This paper begins to fill the
gap.
Berkeley’s task in ‘Passive Obedience’ is, by appeal solely to principles of reason
common to all mankind, to inculcate and explain the Christian duty of passive obedience
to the supreme civil power that makes and enforces laws (henceforth, ‘the state’).4 Passive
obedience means fulfilling the laws either by a punctual performance of what they enjoin
or, where that is inconsistent with reason or conscience, by a patient submission to
whatever penalties the state imposes for non-performance (paras. I-III).5 In 1688, the
Protestant William III had ousted the Catholic James II as King of England, Scotland and
Ireland, and the attempted restoration of James, which took hold in Ireland and divided
the Irish along religious-ethnic lines, was defeated at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. The
turmoil had presented Irish Protestants with an apparent conflict between the Anglican
adherence to the doctrine of passive obedience and their support for William. Some
argued that James had effectively abdicated, or that William was a just conqueror, or that
the doctrine of passive obedience needed qualification, or that it could be set aside in
extreme circumstances, or even that William’s ousting of James had been due to an act of
God. Berkeley was an infant during the turmoil and the debates that followed it, but in
1712, when he wrote his tract as a Fellow at Trinity College, Dublin, political polarisation
had reignited the controversy. Berkeley’s intention was to support William and promote
civil peace, but some took him to be a supporter of James.6
I begin by expounding Berkeley’s rule-consequentialism and extricating it from
his theology. I take no account here of the other strands in Berkeley’s moral theory.7 I
then explain that Berkeley’s defence of passive obedience suggests a rule-consequentialist
explanation of political authority. I develop and correct that explanation to make a new
For historical references to Berkeley as ’the good bishop’ see Scott Breuninger, Recovering Bishop
Berkeley: Virtue and Society in the Anglo-Irish Context (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), Ch. 1.
3 Tom Christiano, ‘Authority’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Spring 2013 Edition, edited by
Edward N. Zalta, available online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/
authority/ (accessed 2014-11-4); Richard Dagger and David Lefkowitz, ‘Political Obligation’, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Fall 2014 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta, available online at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/political-obligation/ (accessed 2014-10-27);
Leslie Green, ‘Legal Obligation and Authority’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Winter 2012
Edition,
edited
by
Edward
N.
Zalta,
available
online
at
http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/legal-obligation/ (accessed 2014-11-5); Fabienne Peter,
‘Political Legitimacy’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Winter 2014 Edition, edited by Edward
N. Zalta, available online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/legitimacy/
(accessed 2014-11-4).
4 George Berkeley, ‘Passive Obedience’, in The Works of George Berkeley, Volume VI, edited by A. A.
Luce and T. E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1953 [1712]), pp. 15-46.
5 Throughout, all parenthetical references to numbered paragraphs are to Berkeley, ‘Passive
Obedience’.
6 Breuninger, Recovering Bishop Berkeley, pp. 20-34.
7 For which see Matti Häyry, ‘Passive Obedience and Berkeley’s Moral Philosophy’, Berkeley Studies
23 (2012), pp. 3-14, especially p. 11.
2
24
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
contribution to the contemporary philosophical debate about the problem of political
authority. In the light of that development, I criticise Berkeley’s defence of passive
obedience. In the conclusion I highlight further work needed to develop the explanation.
Rule Consequentialism
Berkeley says that because God created and preserves us we have a duty to conform our
actions to His will. God, being infinitely good, intends the good of His creatures and thus
that the actions of each individual human should promote the well-being of all humans
(paras. V-VII). However, it is impossible that a person should, in each circumstance,
attempt to identify the action which would produce the greatest good for humanity,
because the full consequences of a possible action cannot be known by a person in
advance, or at all, and surely not in the time available to make a decision. In contrast, a
compendious set of exceptionless rules is open to practical mastery. Thus, what is
enjoined by the will of God is adherence to those moral rules which, if universally acted
upon, have a necessary tendency to promote the well-being of humanity in general, so far
as it is attainable by human actions, even though in some particular instances action in
accord with the rules may, through untoward accidents and the perverse irregularity of
human wills, occasion great sufferings and misfortunes (paras. VIII-XI, XV). Although
our limited capacities require that the moral rules are exceptionless in the sense that no
deviation from them is permissible, the statement of a particular rule may specify some
exceptions. For instance, the moral rule, ‘one ought not to murder’, might also be
expressed as ‘one ought not to kill another person except in battle or in self-defence or in
capital punishment’ (para. XXXII). In framing the true moral rules we must be guided
entirely by the general human good, but in our ordinary moral actions we must be
guided by the moral rules (para. XXXI).
We can separate rule-consequentialism from Berkeley’s theism as follows. The
value of the general good of humanity is so great that we (morally) ought to do our best
to bring it about. The best prospects for its achievement will be realised if we all act in
conformity with a particular set of rules R1…Rn. Therefore, we (morally) ought to act in
conformity with the rules R1…Rn. Therefore, each of the rules R1…Rn is a true moral rule.
That is analogous to the transmission of value from ends to means; and since the purpose
of the means is to achieve the end, we might express the account teleologically, though
metaphorically, by saying that the purpose of morality is the general good of humanity.
A theist such as Berkeley can then add (para. XI) that God’s purpose is the general good
of humanity and, since he who wills the end wills the necessary means (if he knows them
and is instrumentally rational), the set of true moral rules are expressions of God’s will.
True moral rules include a number of universal ought-statements, such as, ‘one
ought not to lie’, ‘one ought not to steal’ and ‘one ought not to commit adultery’ (para.
XV). As we have seen, what distinguishes the true universal ought-statements from those
which are false, such as ‘one ought not to sing’, is that the former form a set such that, if
everyone always acted in accord with them, the well-being of all humans would be
promoted as far as is possible in this world. The well-being of all would not be perfectly
achieved under such circumstances, in part because of ‘untoward accidents’ (para. VIII).
Berkeley does not say what sorts of accidents he has in mind, though he does speak of the
‘unhappy concurrence of events’ (para. XIII). That suggests that the type of thing in
question is misfortunes consequent upon imperfect skill or knowledge. Here is a couple
25
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
of examples. At dinner I see a guest looking for the salt, so I reach for the salt to pass it to
her, but in doing so I knock over a glass of wine and stain the expensive outfit of the
woman sitting next to me. A friend who loves landscape paintings is currently
melancholy, so I send her a beautiful landscape painting to raise her spirits; but,
unbeknown to me, the scene depicted bears an uncanny resemblance to a place she
frequented in her childhood which brings back awful memories. So, universal
compliance with the set of true universal ought-statements cannot guarantee the wellbeing of all; it provides only the best prospects for it.
There is not much chance of universal compliance with the true universal oughtstatements: people often act contrary to moral rules for the sake of some material
advantage or even to indulge wicked desires; and good people suffer as a consequence.
The existence of ‘the perverse irregularity of human wills’ (para. VIII) means that there
are often circumstances in which action in accord with the true moral rules produces
worse consequences for human well-being than would transgression of them. Berkeley
does not give an example, but here is a familiar one.8 In a small South American town,
twenty Indians are tied up against a wall. There have been protests against the
government and the Indians have been selected at random to be shot, to discourage
further protests. A foreign botanist comes upon the scene and the captain in charge offers
him a guest’s privilege of killing one of the Indians himself. If the botanist accepts the
offer, the other Indians will be set free; otherwise all twenty will be shot. The botanist, on
Berkeley’s view, ought to comply with the moral rule ‘one ought not to murder’, even if
nineteen more people will be murdered as a consequence. His reason is that, given that
the purpose of morality is to promote general human well-being, we have a choice
between act-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism, and the former is impossible
given our limited capacities.
It might seem that in any case in which an action that would best promote the
general good is prohibited by a moral rule, R, an amendment to R which makes an
exception of that type of case would better promote the general good than R does; in
which case it is the amended rule rather than R that belongs to the set of true moral rules.
Following that thought to its logical conclusion, it may seem that rule-consequentialism
collapses into act-consequentialism, because any apparent conflict between the two only
shows that the rules need to be amended; and a refusal to make the necessary
amendments would seem to be a fetishistic attachment to a particular set of rules.9
However, that line of thought is mistaken. The rule, ‘one ought not to murder
except when doing so will have better prospects for the general good than any alternative
action’, is open to the objection to act-consequentialism, that it is impossible that a person
should, in each circumstance, attempt to identify which action would have better
prospects for the general good. Rules so qualified would be useless. It might be suggested
that, instead of the general clause, ‘except when doing so will have better prospects for
the general good than any alternative action’, every statement of a rule should contain a
Bernard Williams, ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams,
Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 98.
9 The claim is made by J. J. C. Smart, ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’, Philosophical Quarterly
6:25 (1956), pp. 344-354, section III, and refined by David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 177-186. It is repeated by many philosophers, such as
A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1979), pp. 51-52.
8
26
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
clause listing each type of exception in which action contrary to the rule will better
promote the general good. But that is open to a similar objection: we cannot identify in
advance all of the particular types of exceptions. It is also open to the objection that, even
if we could formulate such rules, they would be so complex, containing so many very
detailed descriptions of exceptional cases, that they could not be employed in practical
decision-making. It is not rule fetishism to adhere to a set of moral rules on the grounds
that the impossibility of act-consequentialism makes a learnable set of rules necessary
and that the set of rules in question is learnable and provides better prospects for general
human welfare than any other learnable set of rules.
Berkeley recognises that the moral rules that he enunciates presuppose a set of
social institutions (para. XXV). Those institutions are in turn constituted in part by other
moral rules. Thus, the rule, ‘one ought not to steal’, presupposes the institution of
property, which implies that people have moral authorities, rights, duties and liabilities.10
For example, a property-owner has the moral right to exclude others from his property,
the moral duty not to destroy the property of others, the moral authority to alter existing
moral rights and duties concerning property, of himself and of others, by entering a
contract to buy or sell or hire, and the moral liability to have his existing moral rights or
duties altered by others who may, for instance, give him permission to enter their
property and thus annul his erstwhile moral duty not to enter it. Similarly, the rule, ‘one
ought not to commit adultery’, presupposes the institution of marriage, which implies
that people have the moral authority to enter marriage contracts and to alter their prior
moral rights and duties as a consequence. The ought-statements to which Berkeley pays
explicit attention are therefore somewhat surface phenomena, in that they depend upon
the background moral rules assigning moral authorities, rights, duties and liabilities
which underlie the institutional framework of the society.
The Possibility of Political Authority
Berkeley argues that the general good of humanity depends upon social co-operation
which in turn depends upon submission to a state and its laws (para. XXV) and that the
set of true moral rules includes the rule of passive obedience (para. XV). That rule, like
the other ought-statements in the set, presupposes an institutional background, in this
case the institution of the state (para. XXV). As the rule, ‘one ought not to steal’, is
underpinned by the moral right of the property-owner to deny others the use of her
property and the correlative duty of those others not to take her property without her
consent, so the rule, ‘one ought not to resist the state’, would be explained if the state has
the moral authority to make and enforce laws for the people within its jurisdiction so that
those people are liable to be morally bound by those laws and subject to their
enforcement. Thus, sovereignty belongs originally to the state (paras. I-IV, XVI), rather
than being given to the state by the people through a social contract (paras. XXII-XXIV). I
discuss the rule of passive obedience below. Here I want to offer a more detailed
For detailed explanations of these moral and legal notions and their interrelations see Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, edited by Walter Wheeler Cook (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1919) and Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1990).
10
27
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
development of Berkeley’s rule-consequentialist insight that the political authority of the
state is a moral fact independent of people’s thoughts or wills.
It was noted above that the set of true moral rules is such that:
(i)
if everyone always acts in accord with the rules, the best prospects for the general
good of humanity will be achieved;
(ii) there is not much chance that everyone will always act in accord with the rules.
Many more people will act in accord with moral rules much more of the time if it is
permissible to enforce at least some of those rules. For example, the rule which assigns to
each person the moral right not to be murdered, which entails the rule that everyone has
a moral duty not to murder, will more generally be adhered to if persons have the moral
right to enforce their right not to be murdered, that is, if they have the moral right of selfdefence. It will even more generally be adhered to if third parties also have the moral
right to enforce a person’s right not to be murdered, by preventing an aggressor from
murdering another. Since rules assigning such rights of enforcement would substantially
increase the frequency of adherence to true moral rules, they would improve the
prospects of the general good of humanity. They therefore also belong to the set of true
moral rules. General adherence to true moral rules, and the prospects for the general
good of humanity, would increase much farther if there were a single body (the state)
which had:
(a) the duty to enforce those true moral rules that are permissibly enforceable;
(b) the authority to promulgate laws declaring true permissibly enforceable moral
rules;
(c) the authority to make efficient institutional arrangements for the enforcement of
true permissibly enforceable moral rules (police, courts, penal and restitutive
measures, and arrangements for defence against external aggression);
(d) the authority to levy fair taxes on the citizens to pay for those arrangements.
Rules assigning that duty and those authorities to the state therefore belong to the set of
true moral rules.
In Western societies, and perhaps in all others, it is not the case that all moral
rules are permissibly enforceable. For example, a promisor gives a promisee a moral right
to fulfilment of the promise; but, unless there is an exchange of promises (a contract), the
promisee is not entitled to enforce her right if the promisor defaults. Contracts, in
contrast, engender moral rights that are permissibly enforceable by the courts. If the set of
true moral rules includes some which it is impermissible to enforce, it will be because
some true moral rules are such that, if they were permissibly enforceable, the prospects
for the general good of humanity would be diminished. The explanation would reside in
the high cost or other disadvantages of permitting the enforcement of true moral rules of
particular types; but we can leave that issue on one side.
Historically, the state emerges against a background of evolved moral rules and it
typically takes upon itself the enforcement of a substantial portion of those rules;11 but
since the evolved rules may require supplementation or correction, the state must have,
11
Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (London: Routledge, 1982), Volume 1.
28
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
in addition to the moral duty enunciated in (a), also the moral authority identified in (b).
The moral authorities identified in (c) and (d) give the state considerable permissible
leeway because there may be any number of different but equally efficient ways of
arranging for enforcement and any number of different but equally fair ways of raising a
given sum through taxation. In promulgating the laws governing the arrangements it
establishes, the state therefore exercises the moral authority to create new duties in the
citizens which the citizens would not have had but for the state’s action. For example, in
creating a police force the state passes laws which give police officers rights to enter
property or to stop, search or direct citizens, which in turn create new duties in the
citizens to allow the police to do such things. There are innumerable alternative sets of
rights that could be given to the police, and some of those alternatives may be equally as
good as each other and better than the rest, in which case which new duties the citizens
receive depends upon which set the state permissibly chooses. With regard to taxation,
the state also passes laws which citizens thereby have a duty to obey. There are any
number of equally fair tax laws which raise the same overall amount of tax but which
employ principles which distribute the burden slightly differently between the citizens.
So, the duty to pay a particular amount of tax derives from the duty to obey the
particular tax laws which the state has permissibly decided to promulgate. However, in
all such cases, the state’s permissible leeway is limited to selection from among those
potential laws which are equally good from the standpoint of the general good of
humanity. That follows from the fact that the rules which assign the state’s moral
authorities belong to the set of true moral rules only because of their connection to the
general good of humanity; so they will not assign the state moral authorities to
promulgate laws which would undermine the prospects for the general human good.12
The reason there should be a single body with the duty and authorities specified
in (a) - (d) is that a multiplicity of competing bodies would engender internecine strife.
The practical difficulties of managing affairs over a large scale mean that a state should
be confined to a manageable territory and thus that humanity should be divided into
separate states. The laws of the states may differ, given the (limited) permissible leeway
that a state has in promulgating laws.
The state is an institution, not a person. It is a network of relations structured by
norms, including rules which assign moral authorities, rights, duties and liabilities to
particular citizens under specific circumstances; it includes people only qua occupants of
particular roles, and those roles are themselves patterns of relations structured by
norms.13 For instance, the moral authorities, rights, duties and liabilities attaching to the
office of the Prime Minister may be assigned to the leader of the political party that
obtains most votes in an election. The moral authorities, rights, duties and liabilities of
the state are realised in moral authorities, rights, duties and liabilities of specific
individuals which attach to those individuals only insofar as they fulfil a particular social
role.
Where the state has a choice between alternative equally optimal enforceable moral rules, the
true moral rule is a disjunction of each of the alternatives. In such cases, the state’s duty or
authority concerns not the moral rule itself but any one of its disjuncts. That complication is
suppressed in the text to avoid circumlocution.
13 See Dorothy Emmett, Rules, Roles and Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 1-16, 138-148.
12
29
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
The duty identified in (a), above, is the duty to enforce only true moral rules.
Plainly, a state which had a duty to enforce false moral rules would be detrimental to the
general good of humanity, so a rule assigning such a duty to the state does not belong to
the set of true moral rules, which means that no state has such a duty. For the same
reason, no state has the moral authority to promulgate or enforce false moral rules, which
means that any state that promulgates or enforces false moral rules is acting outside of its
moral authority and is thus acting wrongly.
Knowledge and Actual States
We need a solution to the knowledge problem: how can we know which of the myriad
possible sets of moral rules is the correct one? Berkeley says that, on an impartial survey
of the general frame and circumstances of human nature, it will appear plainly to anyone
who has the use of reason, that universal compliance with the rules, ‘one ought not to lie’,
‘one ought not to steal’, and ‘one ought not to commit adultery’, has a necessary
connection with the well-being of humanity (paras. XV, XXVIII-XXIX). He says that those
moral rules ‘necessarily result from the Nature of Things’, are ‘stamped on the Mind’ and
‘may be demonstrated by the infallible deductions of Reason’ (para. XII). There are at
least two reasons why it seemed reasonable to Berkeley to claim that the set of true moral
rules is knowable infallibly by pure reason. The first is that, in his day, Christianity
dominated his culture and the culture of the other educated nations within his purview,
so Christian moral precepts were taken for granted by almost all of the educated people
with whom he came into contact, which would have made them seem axiomatic. The
other reason is that Berkeley expresses moral rules using terms that are already loaded
with moral force. For example, the statements ‘one ought not to steal’ (para. XV) and ‘one
ought not to murder’ (para. XXXII) each contains a term, respectively, ‘steal’ and
‘murder’, that connotes moral wrong, so people generally will agree that such statements
are generally true. However, agreement on such statements with morally-loaded terms
can camouflage substantial disagreements about which actions count as stealing or which
actions count as murder. For instance, Berkeley denies that capital punishment is murder
(para. XXXII), but many educated people in contemporary Western societies would say
that it is. Similarly, there are nowadays heated disputes about whether taxation,
copyright infringement or even legal tax-avoidance is stealing; and whether abortion,
euthanasia or assisted suicide is murder. In our post-Christian, culturally diverse
societies, the claim that the set of true moral rules is knowable by a priori reflection seems
preposterous.
The knowledge problem concerns the consequences and risks for human welfare
of types of human action in different institutional environments, so we must look to the
social sciences for the solution.14 Any such appeal to the social sciences presupposes an
account of what sorts of things make for human welfare. It should be possible to obtain a
broad consensus on a set of features of human life, described without using moral terms,
such that general human welfare varies with how fully that set of features is realised.15
Emmett, Rules, Roles and Relations, pp. 125-137.
For example, the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and others
is a recent contribution to that project. For a general discussion see Ingrid Robeyns, ‘The Capability
14
15
30
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
We should then be able to construct a formula which orders sets of moral rules according
to how fully the set of features would be likely to be realised if each set of rules were
universally followed. It should be noted that the rule-consequentialist knowledgeproblem is of a different order to the act-consequentialist knowledge-problem. It is
simply impossible for each, or for any, individual to calculate consequences for every
option for action that he takes or fails to take, in part because the consequences of an
action often depend upon how other people act in response and are thus knowable only
if people act largely in accordance with rules. It is difficult to acquire social-scientific
knowledge about the consequences of implementing different systems of rules and to
develop generally acceptable metrics of welfare, but there is already a great deal of
relevant research and further progress can be made; and it is possible that people should
conform their actions to a set of rules that such research discovers to be best.
Since the results of scientific research are always open to revision in light of new
discoveries, we can never know for sure whether the rules being enforced by a particular
state are true ones; and thus we can never know for sure whether the state acts with
political authority. However, a state which assiduously revises its legislation in line with
the latest social-scientific findings is either:
(A) enforcing true moral rules (if the latest social-scientific results happen to be
correct); or
(B) enforcing false ones excusably, because it cannot reasonably be expected to know
that the rules it is enforcing are false.
In case (A) it has political authority; in case (B) it does not have political authority and
acts wrongly, but excusably. No one can know for sure which of (A) or (B) is the case; but
whichever it is, the state is not acting culpably. Correspondingly, the citizens of such a
state who obey its laws are ether acting rightly or they are acting wrongly but excusably,
so their obedience is not culpable.
In contrast, actual states, while they often pay lip-service to ‘the common good’,
generally promulgate and enforce laws, and establish institutional arrangements and
systems of taxation, either oblivious of, or in opposition to, the findings of social-scientific
research, as a result of deals made between officers of the state seeking to enhance their
electoral or career prospects and representatives of organised groups that seek to increase
their own wealth or well-being at the expense of the general public.16 It is just possible
that some of these states have by pure fluke hit upon the set of true enforceable moral
rules, in which case they have political authority as a matter of chance and without trying
to obtain it. But it is more plausible that no actual state has political authority; and none
can exonerate itself by showing the consonance of its legislation with the findings of the
social sciences. Thus, while the rule-consequentialist account can explain how it is
possible for a state to have political authority, it simultaneously impugns the political
Approach’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Summer 2011 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta,
available online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/capability-approach/
(accessed 2015-1-20).
16 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965),
The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Power and Prosperity (New
York: Basic Books, 2000).
31
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
authority of all actual states and suggests that the wrong behaviour of existing states is
culpable.
Passive Obedience
If, as seems to be the case, existing states act without political authority, and culpably, in
promulgating and enforcing false moral rules, what are the citizens to do? Berkeley says
that they have a duty of passive obedience that requires them to obey the false moral
rules except in cases where that would conflict with a true moral rule, in which cases the
citizens have a duty to comply with the true moral rule and accept the state’s penalty for
failure to comply with the false moral rule (paras. I-III). The duty to obey false moral
rules imposed by the state or to accept the penalty for not obeying them, is not a duty to
the state, which has no right to impose false moral rules, but a duty assigned by the rule
of passive obedience which belongs to the set of true moral rules; in Berkeley’s
theological terms, it is a duty to God (paras. XXXVII, XXXIX, XLIV). The duty is
exceptionless and ought morally to be fulfilled even in cases where its consequences are
detrimental to the general good (para. LIV).
Berkeley’s arguments for assigning the rule of passive obedience to the set of true
moral rules are not cogent. His first argument is that even a despotic state is preferable to
anarchy (paras. XV-XVIII, XLV, LI). However, that assumes that the use of force to resist
the state entails anarchy, which is not so, since such resistance could be sporadic or
targeted rather than general.
Berkeley’s second argument is that, without the exceptionless rule of passive
obedience, there would be disputes about when the use of force is permissible, which
would in turn lead to anarchy (para. XX). That confuses epistemological and ontological
issues. Let us, for the sake of argument, grant Berkeley that the exceptionless rule of
passive obedience is true as a matter of objective fact. There are still disputes between
people about whether it is true, and thus about when the use of force against the state is
permissible. Indeed, Berkeley himself says that, if it is not clear which person or group
has a legitimate claim to represent the state, it will not be clear to whom the people have
a duty to submit (para. LIII); in which case there may be disputes over whether the use of
force against the (legitimate) state is permissible. That was the case when Berkeley wrote,
but it did not lead to anarchy; similarly, in contemporary Western societies there are
disputes over the permissibility of resisting the state, but they have not led to anarchy.
Berkeley’s third argument is that, while it is possible that an attempt to remove a
government by force may succeed, the danger of civil war, or of failure followed by
repression, make it inadvisable (para. XLVII). That is a legitimate worry for general
resistance, but less so for targeted acts of resistance. The attacks on agents of the state
(police, soldiers and so on) and ordinary citizens by terrorists in contemporary Western
societies, for example, have not led to civil war, though they have led to significant
erosions of civil liberties.
Berkeley’s fourth argument is that, in any case of resistance, large or small, we
can never know whether the use of force will promote the general good, so we need an
exceptionless rule of passive obedience (para. XIX). That just repeats the argument for the
superiority of rule-consequentialism over act-consequentialism. As such, it leaves open
the question of whether Berkeley’s rule of passive obedience or some other more nuanced
rule is the correct one.
32
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
Ironically, Berkeley himself proposes a qualification to the statement of the rule
of passive obedience. He says that the duty of passive obedience does not require
submission without opposition to usurpers or madmen in control of the state, because
such exceptions are specified in the proper formulation of the rule (paras. LII-LIV). He
regards it as obvious that the statement of the rule should specify those exceptions (para.
LII). It is thus easy to see how Berkeley’s sympathies were misinterpreted: was it William
or James who was a usurper? Unfortunately, Berkeley cannot consistently admit that
qualification of the rule. If, as he claims, resistance to the state is impermissible because it
entails anarchy, it will entail anarchy, and thus be impermissible, when the state happens
to be controlled by a usurper or madman.
We are left without an answer to the question of when it is permissible to use
force to resist a state that acts culpably without political authority. But it seems that, if we
do retain a rule of passive obedience, its statement will include exceptions that
distinguish it from the rule that Berkeley defended.
Conclusion
Bishop Berkeley’s ‘Passive Obedience’ indicates a theological rule-consequentialist
explanation of political authority. I have developed that explanation by spelling it out in
more detail and by removing its invocation of moral rules knowable infallibly by pure
reason, grounded ultimately in God’s will. The result seems to be a promising solution to
the problem of how political authority is possible, which explains why the state has the
duty to enforce true permissibly enforceable moral rules, and the (limited) authorities to
promulgate and enforce new laws, to create new duties for the citizens, to pass laws
which citizens thereby have a duty to obey, to levy fair taxes and to institute efficient
administrative arrangements. The solution posits true moral rules which are grounded in
the value of the general good of humanity and which are to be discovered by socialscientific research. However, it impugns the political authority of all actual states and the
duty to either obey their laws or accept the penalties they impose for disobedience.
Needless to say, the solution is pitched at a general level and it needs to be
developed in more detail. First, the non-moral features of human life that constitute the
general good of humanity need more detailed specification; but work on that issue is
already underway. Second, while the solution assigns sovereignty directly to the state,
rather than directly to the people (as in democratic theories), that leaves open the
question as to whether, despite all the defects of democracy, democratic elections may be
the best available means for limiting abuses of state power by its agents. Third, it will not
always be clear what the latest social-scientific results indicate, since science is
characterised by competing research programmes. That problem is not as acute as might
at first be thought. For one thing, social scientists may disagree on many things without
disagreeing about which set of moral rules, if universally acted upon, would be likely to
yield the best results for the general human good. For another thing, although we can
expect different social scientists to espouse different theories about that matter, they may
be able to agree about which of the available theories appears to have greatest
explanatory scope and simplicity and to stand up best to empirical tests given the current
state of the debate. Advocates of a challenger hypothesis often realise that their hypothesis
is a challenger: they accept that they have more work to do, though they have avenues of
investigation to pursue that they hope will eventually show their hypothesis to be better
33
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
than the currently leading theory. Still, some new procedure would doubtless need to be
introduced to reach a decision for political purposes in cases where there is no clear
leader among the competing social-scientific theories about the consequences of rival sets
of moral rules.
In those three respects, the explanation of political authority presented can be
developed in rival ways. Such rival developments will form a family of ruleconsequentialist solutions to the problem of political authority to be evaluated in the light
of ongoing social-scientific research. The possibility of such rule-consequentialist
solutions has been overlooked by contemporary political philosophers.17
Danny Frederick
dannyfrederick77@gmail.com
Bibliography
Berkeley, George. ‘Passive Obedience’ [1712], in The Works of George Berkeley, Volume VI,
edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1953, pp. 1546.
Breuninger, Scott. Recovering Bishop Berkeley: Virtue and Society in the Anglo-Irish Context.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Christiano, Tom. ‘Authority’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Spring 2013 Edition,
edited
by
Edward
N.
Zalta.
Online
at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/authority/ (accessed 2014-11-4).
Dagger, Richard and Lefkowitz, David. ‘Political Obligation’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy: Fall 2014 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Online at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/political-obligation/ (accessed
2014-10-27).
Emmett, Dorothy. Rules, Roles and Relations. London: Macmillan, 1966.
Estlund, David. Democratic Authority. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Green, Leslie. ‘Legal Obligation and Authority’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Winter
2012
Edition,
edited
by
Edward
N.
Zalta.
Online
at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/legal-obligation/
(accessed
2014-11-5).
Hayek, Friedrich. Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge, 1982.
Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb. Fundamental Legal Conceptions, edited by Walter Wheeler
Cook. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919.
Häyry, Matti. ‘Passive Obedience and Berkeley’s Moral Philosophy’, Berkeley Studies 23
(2012), pp. 3-14.
Lyons, David. Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.
Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1965.
Olson, Mancur. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
17 I thank two anonymous reviewers for De Ethica for comments and suggestions that helped me to
improve my exposition.
34
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 3:2 (2016)
Olson, Mancur. Power and Prosperity. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
Peter, Fabienne. ‘Political Legitimacy’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Winter 2014
Edition,
edited
by
Edward
N.
Zalta.
Online
at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/legitimacy/ (accessed 2014-114).
Robeyns, Ingrid. ‘The Capability Approach’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Summer 2011 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Online at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/capability-approach/
(accessed
2015-1-20).
Simmons, A. John. Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979.
Smart, J. J. C. ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’, Philosophical Quarterly 6:25 (1956),
pp. 344-354.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. The Realm of Rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1990.
Williams, Bernard. ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams,
Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 75150.
35