Journal of the History of Philosophy

Peirce's Reality and Berkeley's Blunders LESLEY FRIEDMAN IN A NUMBER OF HIS LATE REMARKS,Peirce makes it clear that he holds Bishop Berkeley in the highest esteem. Hailed as the "father of all modern philosophy ," Peirce argues that Berkeley, not Kant, "first produced an Erkenntnistheorie , or 'principles of human knowledge', which was for the most part correct in its positive assertions" (RFB, 96)? This is not at all to say that Berkeley escapes rebuke; in spite of several laudatory remarks, ~ Peirce takes him to task for two errors: his view of reality as actual perception, and his neglect of real possibility. Additionally, in some passages we find Berkeley both credited for some insight and admonished for some oversight. In one such occurrence, ' The following abbreviationsare used throughout this paper: RFB "Reviewof Fraser's Berkeley," Nation 73 (19ol): 95-96. LSB Robert G. Meyers and Richard H. Popkin, eds., "Early Influenceson Peirce: A Letter to Samuel Barnett,"Journalof theHistoryofPhilosophy31 (1993): 6o7-21. This letter is dated December 2o, 19o9. CP Collected Papersof CharlesSandersPeirce,eds. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss(vols. 1-6). and A. Burks (vols. 7-8) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, ]931-1958). Cited by volume and paragraph number. MS Peirce's manuscripts from microfilm rolls a-3o, following the Robin listing: Annotated Catalogue of thePapers of CharlesS. Peirce(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1967). S Supplementary microfilm, rolls 31 and 32, following the Robin listing: "The Peirce Papers: A Supplementary Catalogue," Transactionsof the CharlesS. PeirceSociety7 0971): 37-57P Berkeley's A TreatiseConcerningthePrinciplesof Human Knowledge, ed. Kenneth Winkler (Indianapolis:Hackett PublishingCompany, 1982). 9Other remarks include the following: "It was he, more than any other single philosopher, who should be regarded as the author of that method of modern 'pragmatism'..." (RFB, ~9oa, 96). "In the course of those years my Kantism got whittled down to small dimensions.... On the other hand, I found great pabulum in Berkeley..." (MS, 62o, 19o9). "Now a reader who holds the spirit of captiousness in contempt comes near to being one whom I could press to my bosom, especially were it allowed expression toward a thinker to whom I owed half what I owe to Berkeley" (MS, 663, 1910, p. al). [253] 254 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:2 APRIL i99 7 Peirce attributes to Berkeley the wisdom that reality is relative to thought; "although," Peirce continues, "he blundered when from that manifest truth he inferred his idealism" (CP, 6.339, 19o9). Nevertheless, in an unpublished passage, we learn that (with some modification) Peirce identifies his own conditional idealism with Berkeley's metaphysical view: "Among all the doctrines of metaphysics, there is none that seems to me to be more obviously favored by this rule of methodeutic [pragmatism] than what may be called conditional idealism, which is Berkeleyanism with some corrections" (MS, 322, c. 19o7). On the one hand, then, it seems that Peirce sees his idealism as some version of Berkeley's; while on the other, he insists that Berkeley is guilty of significant metaphysical blunders. Since Peirce elaborates neither his idealism nor realism in great detail, much can be learned from the numerous critiques he offers of other views. As a means of clarifying Peirce's realism and (conditional ) idealism then, an examination of the errors and the insights that he attributes to Berkeley is useful.~ I begin with a discussion of Peirce's explanation of 'real', and of the difference between internal and external realities. This is followed by an account of Peirce's Berkeley, and a comparison of their respective idealisms. I suggest that despite his seeming admiration, Peirce's metaphysical agreement with Berkeley is superficial, more so than even Peirce himself leads us to believe. I argue that they are fundamentally divided about the distinction between actual and possible cognition, the status of external realities, and, ultimately, the nature of perception. One important consequence of these differences is that Berkeley is led to reject what Peirce takes to be the most important realities: generals and possibilities. 1. TWO FORMULATIONS OF 'REAL' The word 'real', Peirce contends, was invented in the thirteenth century; it was therefore not a part of the ancient nor the twelfth-century metaphysical discussions...