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Historical legacies, institutional change, and policy leadership: the case of Alexandre Millerand and the French factory inspectorate

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Abstract

Focusing on Alexandre Millerand’s reform of the French factory inspectorate, this article highlights the dilemmas of mezzo-level administrative leadership and policy reform in states that have strong administrative capacity, but low public trust and weak associational life. Building on the insights of theories of political and bureaucratic entrepreneurship derived from studies of American political development, the article challenges their taken-for-granted assumptions and comparative applicability, and demonstrates the explanatory potential of the older sociological institutionalism exemplified in the work of Philip Selznick. In particular, the article highlights the unintended consequences of the formal and informal cooptation of targeted social groups for the reputational autonomy of administrative leaders, the (re)definition of institutional mission, and organizational success or failure.

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Notes

  1. Millerand (1859–1943) (1990).

  2. For more on the “state capacities” approach, see Evans et al. (1985). See also Skowronek (1982), Skocpol and Finegold (1982) and Weir et al. (1988).

  3. See Levi (1997), Hardin (2002) and Daunton (2002).

  4. For a standard account of British and French state formation that highlights the contrast between Britain’s “weak” state/“strong” civil society and France’s “strong” state/“weak” civil society, see Badie and Birnbaum (1983) pp. 105–115, 121–125. For more on the nexus between British local and national political and administrative elites, the greater legitimacy of the British state vis-à-vis its continental counterparts, and parliamentary centralization, see Redlich (1903) and Kriegel (1995) pp. 64–90. For the classic interpretation of the French state, see de Tocqueville (1955). For more on French administrative centralization, see Woloch (1994), Skocpol (1979) and Furet (1983).

  5. For the concept of institutional “reputation-building,” see Carpenter (2001a). See article below for a discussion of this concept.

  6. See Elwitt (1986) and Stone (1985).

  7. For the recent American political leadership/entrepreneurship literature, see Sheingate (2003), Miroff (2003), Carpenter (2001a), Roberts (2006), Crowe (2007) and Schickler (2001). For more references, see Sheingate (2003) pp. 187–188, n. 12. For Selznick’s “older” sociological institutionalist perspective on leadership, see Selznick (1983 [1957], 1984 [1949]).

  8. For representative works associated with these different theories, see Selbin (1993) and Aminzade et al. ( 2001).

  9. Carpenter (2001a) pp.18–23.

  10. See Selznick (1983 [1957], 1984 [1949]).

  11. For more on the new institutionalism, see Powell and DiMaggio (1991), especially the editors’ introductory chapter, pp. 1–38. See also Meyer and Scott (1983), March and Olsen (1984), March and Olsen (1989), Scott (1981), Meyer and Rowan (1977), Fligstein (1990), Dobbin (1994) and Zucker (1991).

    For representative scholars associated with historical-institutionalism, see Steinmo et al. (1992). See also Hall (1986), Dunlavy (1993), Hattam (1993), Immergut (1992) and Weir (1992).

  12. See Selznick (1983 [1957], 1984 [1949]). The terms goal displacement, formal and informal cooption, organizational mission, etc., are derived from these works. See article below for a discussion of these terms.

  13. For works that address questions of state autonomy, low trust, and legitimacy in the context of developing societies, see Migdal (1988), Migdal et al. (1994), Rose (1994), Mishler and Rose (1997) and Chen (2005). It should be noted that Joel Migdal uses the term weak state to refer to a state that enjoys low legitimacy, irrespective of its administrative or military capacities. Likewise, for Migdal, the term strong society refers to a traditional, clan-based society that is successfully able to resist state intervention rather than to a society with a rich civic life (see Migdal 1988). State capacity theorists, by contrast, use the term strong state to refer to a state that has strong administrative capacities, irrespective of its overall legitimacy.

  14. See Sheingate (2003) pp. 185–187. See also Campbell (2004) chap. 1 and Thelen (2004) pp. 1–38.

  15. Sheingate (2003) and Miroff (2003).

  16. Sheingate (2003) pp. 185–187 (quote on p. 185). Sheingate traces the concept of political entrepreneurship to Schumpeter (1942) while attributing its early application in political science to Dahl’s classic study of local power in New Haven (see Dahl 1961).

  17. Sheingate (2003) pp. 187–188. This definition also leaves open the question of whether political entrepreneurs are institutional “insiders” or “outsiders,” a contentious point in the early historical literature on economic entrepreneurship. See Hwang and Powell (2005) pp. 180–181.

  18. Sheingate (2003) pp. 185–187.

  19. Ibid., pp. 191–194.

  20. For this reason, Sheingate treats American presidents as political entrepreneurs par excellence. See ibid., pp.195–198.

  21. Ibid., pp.189–190.

  22. Ibid., pp.198–200. For a variety of reasons that Sheingate explores in some detail, “entry barriers” that are too low or too high may discourage entrepreneurial innovation in politics as much as in the marketplace, whereas intermediate “entry barriers” seem optimal for political entrepreneurship.

  23. Ibid., pp.200–201.

  24. Miroff (2003) pp. 206–207 (quote on p. 207).

  25. Ibid., p. 207.

  26. Ibid., p. 205.

  27. Carpenter (2001a).

  28. Ibid., pp.1-36.

  29. Ibid., pp.3–5 (quote on p. 4).

  30. Ibid., pp. 14–18. See also Carpenter (2000, 2001b).

  31. Carpenter (2001b) p.115. For the Bringing the State Back In literature, see Evans et al. (1985).

  32. Carpenter (2001b) pp. 113–115, 117 (quote on p. 115).

  33. See Selznick (1983 [1957]). The intellectual debt that Carpenter owes to Selznick’s (1983 [1957]) is noted in Miroff (2003) p. 207.

  34. See Selznick (1952) and 1984 [1949]. See also Selznick (1996).

  35. Selznick (1983 [1957]) p.17.

  36. Ibid., pp. 4–22, 65–74.

  37. Ibid., pp. 16–20. Note that Selznick’s emphasis on the role of values and leadership to maintain institutional purpose and integrity in the face of internal and external challenges provides us with a more adequate explanation of institutional change than the new sociological institutionalism’s emphasis on the impersonal cultural templates and rituals. See Selznick (1996). For a sharp critique of the new sociological institutionalism by one of Selznick’s former students, see Stinchcombe (1997). The failure of the new institutionalism to take into account the role of agency in institutional change is highlighted in Karabel and Brint (1991) and Hall and Taylor (1996).

  38. For Selznick’s discussion of unintended consequences and goal displacement, see (1984 [1949]) pp. 253–264. For his statement that unintended consequences are not necessarily negative, see ibid., p. 254, n.11.

  39. Ibid., pp. 12–16, 259–261 (quote on p. 13).

  40. Ibid., p.13.

  41. Ibid., pp.13–16, 259–261.

  42. Ibid.

  43. Ibid.

  44. Ibid., pp. 262–264.

  45. For the classic contrast between the US’s strong associational landscape and its “weak” French counterpart, see de Tocqueville (2000). See also de Tocqueville (1955). For more on the American associational landscape during the progressive era, see Carpenter (2000) p.125.

  46. For French society’s ambivalence towards the administrative state, see Hoffmann (1963).

  47. In 1833, the British inspectorate consisted of four inspectors aided by a small staff of sub-inspectors whose numbers expanded from eight to fourteen during the first ten years of its existence. By 1876, the factory inspectorate consisted of 55 inspectors divided into various grades. See Royal Commission on the Factory and Workshop Acts (1876) pp. lxxxvii–lxxxviii. Scholarly writings on the early history of protective legislation (factory acts) are extensive and include such well known works as Hutchins and Harrison (1903), Henriques (1979), Thomas (1948), Driver (1979) and Ward (1962).

  48. The spillover effect of protective labor legislation on adult male workers is analyzed in Webb (1889) esp. pp. 862–865, Webb (1901) pp. 65–74 and Webb and Webb (1911) pp. 355–361.

  49. For the classic analysis of the “rationalization” of British industry as a consequence of factory legislation, see Marx (1979) 1, esp. pp. 394–395, 635. For more on laissez faire opposition to British protective labor legislation, see Blaug (1958). For an excellent discussion of the overall positive impact of British protective labor legislation (or factory legislation) on productivity, wages, profits, prices, and foreign trade, see Jeans (1892).

  50. Factory and Workshops Act (1876), pp. lxxxvii–lxxxviii.

  51. These four points are a concise summary of some of the major findings of Hutchins and Harrison (1903) and Thomas (1948).

  52. The blending of these different ideological currents to justify British protective labor legislation (or factory legislation) is discussed in Martin (1969) and Fuchs (2001). Martin’s essay explores the fusion of paternalism and utilitarianism, while Fuchs’ dissertation builds on Martin’s ideas by exploring the impact of nationalist discourse.

  53. The previous paragraph represents a very concise summary of some of the main conclusions I reached in my dissertation.

  54. See Tallon and Maurice (1875) pp. 15–61.

  55. This was an important consideration in view of France’s difficult financial position after the Franco-Prussian War. See Tallon and Maurice (1875) p. 23.

  56. For arguments by Tallon and other politicians linking British-style factory inspection to social peace, see “Préface,” in Tallon and Maurice (1875) pp. 1–6. See also ibid., “Rapport de M. Eugène Tallon…(11 mai 1872),” pp. 21–25, 53–55 and “Deuxième déliberation,” sess.5 and 8 February, 1873, pp. 242–246, 305–331. The first reading of the bill that would legalize factory inspection (the Law of 19 May 1874) took place on November 25, 1872; the third and final reading on May 19, 1874.

  57. Efforts to regulate factory conditions in France prior to 1874 were sporadic. The creation of the 1874 French factory inspectorate should be seen as the first serious attempt to enforce protective labor laws. For the history of protective labor legislation in France prior to 1874, see Heywood (1988), Weissbach (1989) and Mataja (1895, 1896). See also Mataja (1892).

  58. For debates surrounding the appointment of a chief inspector, see “Deuxième déliberation,” sess. 8 February, 1873, in Tallon and Maurice (1875) pp. 329-334.

  59. The Higher Labor Commission was a nine-member body consisting of two senators, two deputies, and five members appointed by the President. The Higher Labor Commission and the Ministry of Commerce (replaced by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare in 1906) were jointly responsible for supervising the work of the factory inspectorate. For more details, see International Labour Office [ILO] (1923) p. 37, 46–47 and Price (1914) pp. 185–187.

  60. For more on the composition of the local commissions, see the Law of 19 May 1874 (“Loi du 19 mai 1874 sur le travail des enfants et des filles mineures employés dans l’industrie”), sect. VII, article 22: “each local commission is expected to include, whenever possible, a state or civil engineer, an inspector of primary instruction, and in mining regions, a mining engineer (trans. mine).” See République Française. Ministère du Commerce (1895) p. 228.

  61. See Law of 19 May, sect. VII, arts. 20–21 in ibid., pp. 227–228; and “Rapport de Tallon…(11 mai 1872),” in Tallon and Maurice (1875) pp. 56–57.

  62. “Rapport de Tallon…(11 mai 1872)” pp. 56–57 and “Deuxième déliberation,” sess. 8 February, 1873, p. 329 in Tallon and Maurice (1875).

  63. Weissbach (1989) pp. 201–202 and “Deuxième déliberation,” sess. 8 February, 1873, in Tallon and Maurice (1875) pp. 299–334. See also van Overbergh (1893) p. 206.

  64. van Overbergh (1893) pp. 166–184, Bec (1907) pp. 52–54 and Rouanet (1890) pp. 401–402. See also Colmart (1899) pp. 69–85. The understaffing of the inspectorate and the poor coordination between the divisional inspectors (appointed by the Higher Labor Commission) and the departmental inspectors (appointed by the local commissions) were two additional factors that exacerbated the problem of uneven enforcement. See ILO (1923) pp. 38–39.

  65. Weissbach (1989) pp. 201–202 and “Deuxième déliberation,” sess. 8 February, 1873, in Tallon and Maurice (1875) 299–334. See also van Overbergh (1893) p. 206. For more on the centralization of the British factory inspectorate, see Thomas (1948) pp. 46–47, 57–58, 63–64.

  66. See van Overbergh (1893) pp. 156–159, 163–175, Marini (1936) pp. 54–56, Monteil (1909) pp. 30–32, 40–44, Durand (1902) pp. 62–85 and ILO (1923) pp. 38–39.

  67. Much of this unrest took place in the wake of the Second International (1889). See Cross (1989) pp. 71–73. See also Sorlin (1966) pp. 356–364.

  68. This law was known as “Loi du 2 novembre 1892 sur le travail des enfants, des filles mineures et des femmes dans les établissements industriels” (or the Law of 2 November 1892). Its purpose was to reduce the work of children to ten hours a day and of women to eleven. For the legal text, see République Française. Ministère du Commerce (1895) pp. 233–245.

  69. See section VII, articles 24 and 25 of the Law of 2 November 1892 reprinted in ibid., p. 242; Vanlaer (1897) p. 724 and Durand (1902) pp. 114–119. See also Guesde (1901) 2, p. 221.

  70. See section VI, art. 16 of the Law of 2 November 1892, in République Française. Ministère du Commerce (1895) p. 227.

  71. For more on the political role of the mayors in this era, see Wright (1986).

  72. See Vanlaer (1897) p. 735. The mayors’ unwillingness to comply with the legal provisions of work-time regulations for protected workers remained a thorny issue for the factory inspectors even in the years leading up to the First World War. See L’application des lois règlementant le travail en 1911 (1912).

  73. The inspectors could do little to combat the mayors’ corruption other than by notifying the Ministry of Commerce. The Ministry tried to address this problem by issuing circulars that cautioned the prefects to watch for corrupt practices, or, in more extreme cases, by instructing them to contact the mayors. Mayors who failed to cooperate with the prefects could be prosecuted in administrative courts, which rarely happened in practice. The inspectorate’s troubled relationship with the mayors helps highlight the considerable autonomy that the latter enjoyed in local administration. For more on the mayors’ autonomy in local affairs and their failure to comply with labor legislation (e.g., the 1898 accident law), see Archives Nationales, (hereafter AN)/F22/493 (1899–1921), Correspondence between the Minister of Labor and Welfare (Direction du travail) and the Prefect of Seine-et-Oise, 20 January 1913 and 4 June 1913; and AN/F22/475 (1899–1914), Minister of Labor and Social Welfare (Direction de l’assurance et de la prévoyance sociale) to the Prefect of l’Aisne, 13 May 1910.

  74. For more on the “stalemate” society, see Hoffmann (1963) esp. pp. 3–21. For the origin of the term “stalemate” society, see Crozier (1973).

  75. In the course of his long political career that practically overlapped with the historical life-span of the Third Republic, Millerand occupied successive cabinet posts as Minister of Commerce (1899–1902), Minister of Public Works (1909–1910) and Minister of War (1912–1915). After the Great War, Millerand was appointed Prime Minister (1920) and President of the Republic (1920–1924), eventually ending his career, like many elderly French statesmen of the time, as Senator (1927–1940). See Millerand (1859–1943) (1990).

  76. Milbank-Farrar (1977) pp. 9–47, Derfler (1977) p. 25, 125, 174, Persil (1949) pp. 11–17, Weill (1911) pp. 286–293 and Price (1987) p. 247.

  77. Millbank-Farrar (1977) pp. 28–32, 41–47, Hanley (2002) p. 61, Table 4.2 and Weill (1911) pp. 286–293.

  78. Milbank-Farrar (1977) pp. 50–54, Millerand (1859–1943) (1990) p. 291, Bourdeau (1899) and Persil (1949) pp. 45–63. Millerand was expelled from the French Socialist Party in 1904, while his “pariah status” became a topic of debate at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist International. Characteristically, Lenin used the term “Millerandism” to refer to any socialist who had been coopted by the capitalist class by accepting a government post. The threat of expulsion from the Socialist party haunted French socialists until 1936, the year in which Léon Blum formed his national unity government and became the second socialist politician to occupy a government post in the Third Republic. See Derfler (1977) p. vii, pp. 161–162 and Millerand (1859–1943) (1990) p. 291.

  79. Milbank-Farrar (1977) pp. 48–54, 58–59, 83–87 and Derfler (1977) pp. 173–174.

  80. The major social reforms that republican politicians had ratified prior to Millerand’s accession to his cabinet position included the 1884 law on associations and the 1898 law on accident insurance. For more on these reforms, see Weill (1911) pp. 411–425.

  81. Milbank-Farrar (1977) pp. 57–74, 84–87, Derfler (1977) pp. 166–170, 180–190, 207–215 and Persil (1949) pp. 19–44. Millerand’s followers consisted of a dedicated group of civil servants and lawyers who would carry forward his reform vision in the Ministry of Labor. This group included Eugène Petit, Arthur Fontaine, Aimé Lavy, Robert Persil, and Joseph Sarraute. See Derfler (1977) pp. 166–167. For Millerand’s recollections of the labor reforms he initiated as Minister of Commerce, see Millerand (1911).

  82. See Derfler (1982) pp. 20–21. For a more general discussion of the institutional arrangements and political culture of the Third Republic, see Stanley Hoffmann (1963).

  83. Milbank-Farrar (1977) pp. 85–86 and Persil (1949) pp. 214–215.

  84. For the impact of Tory paternalism on British protective labor legislation, see Driver (1979).

  85. Defler (1977) pp. 216–219.

  86. The Law of 30 March 1900, (“La Loi du 30 mars 1900 sur le travail des ouvriers adultes dans les établissements à personnel mixte” or “La Loi Millerand”), like the Law of 2 November 1892, defined the term child to mean any person (male or female) between the ages of 13 and 16 insofar as it related to the length of the workday. Like the 1892 law, it prohibited children below the age of 13 from being employed in factories. Another category of workers protected by this law were young adolescent women, i.e. female workers between the ages of 16 and 18. For the Law of 30 March, 1900, see Massé (1904) pp. 306–307. See also the Law of 2 November 1892, see sect. I, arts. 1–3, reprinted in République Française. Ministère du Commerce (1895) p. 227.

  87. Lavy (1902) pp. 40–42, Milbank-Farrar (1977) pp. 62–63, Derfler (1977) pp. 179–180 and Stone (1985) p. 131. According to Millerand, the number of men affected by the law was 1,111,335, the number of women 603,185 and the number of children, 433,677. See Millerand (1906) p. 19.

  88. Stone (1985) pp. 126–129, Viet (1994) 1, pp. 244–247, Derfler (1977) p. 179, Louis (1904) pp. 232–236 and Breton (1900). See also Rouanet (1900).

  89. Breton (1900); Association nationale française pour la protection légale des travailleurs (ANFLT) (1905) esp. pp. 150–157, Derfler (1977) p. 179 and de Seilhac (1903a). The employers’ argument was summed up by an influential spokesman for the Association des industriels du Nord de la France as follows (1904): “That we should march ahead and set an example [by reducing the workday] is a very wonderful thing; nevertheless we should not sacrifice our industry; we should not rush because when you rush you risk falling (my translation).” See ANFLT (1905) p. 153.

  90. Derfler (1977) p. 180, Cross (1989) pp. 125–127, Louis (1904) pp. 234–235 and Levine (1914) pp. 251–259.

  91. Dépasse (1891).

  92. Jules Guesde (1901), 2, p. 125.

  93. See decree of 1 Sept. 1899 reprinted and discussed in Lavy (1902) pp. 66–72, Bourdeau (1903) p. 405, Weill (1911) p. 421 and Persil (1949) pp. 26–27. One-third of the Council’s members were elected by professional workers’ associations and another third by professional employers’ associations. The remaining third was appointed by the Minister of Commerce and consisted mainly of academics, legislators, lawyers, and civil servants. Millerand held high hopes for the Higher Labor Council, stating that “the Higher Labor Council will play a similar role to the grand royal commissions in England that compile and bring to light through their relentless and minute investigations the grievances of labor (my translation).” See Lavy (1902) p. 72.

  94. See Lavy (1902) pp. 66–70 and Millerand (1906) pp. 24–25.

  95. Bauer (1921) p. 29 and Jay (1910) p. 316, incl. n.1.

  96. Having passed the highly controversial Law of 30 March 1900, Millerand realized how important it was for the French government to play a leading role in ratifying international labor treaties that would help protect national industries against “unfair competition” and weaken employer resistance. See Pic (1900) pp. 178-179, incl. nn. 1-2 and ANFLT (1905) pp. 115-116.

  97. For more on this body and its non-partisan nature, see Stewart (1989) p. 53.

  98. Lavy (1902) p. 71.

  99. Between 1900 and 1914, the French Association for Protective Labor Legislation conducted more than fifty inquiries on child and female labor, the length of the workday, homework, hygiene and industrial safety, unemployment, and labor conflicts. Frequently, the labor issues addressed by the Association overlapped with those preoccupying the Higher Labor Council. Thus, in 1907 the Higher Labor Council reported on factory inspection, while the French Association of Labor Legislation followed up two years later. See Conseil supérieur du travail (CST) (1907a, b) and ANFLT (1909).

  100. Thus, in the course of the French Association’s debates on the shorter workday (1904), Millerand and Fagnot (an official investigator in Millerand’s ministry), persuaded employers to drop their opposition to the “unified” working day. See ANFLT (1905) pp. 57–62, 105–116.

  101. See Millerand’s speech of 25 July 1900 in CIPLT (1901) pp. 466–467 (quote on p. 467).

  102. Lavy (1902) p. 99.

  103. Ibid., p. 103, Price (1914) p. 195 and Millerand (1900) p. 574.

  104. Viet (1994) 1, pp. 337–339, 398, n. 141. The four inspectors invited to participate in the proceedings of the 1900 Congress were Laporte, Harlé, Pourcines, and Barral. See sess. 26 and 27 July 1900 in CIPLT (1901) pp. 493– 537.

  105. Viet (1994) 1, pp. 337–339. The French Association for Protective Labor Legislation delegated six of its reports to the factory inspectors. The inspectors’ reports were devoted to the abolition of night work (1909) (1911); the enforcement of protective labor legislation in the public state sector (1908); the improvement of labor conditions of female shop assistants (1906) and of workers in factories à feu continu (1912); and accident prevention (1909).

  106. See Actes et documents officiels (1900). Circulaire en date du 19 janvier 1900 (hereafter cited as Circulaire 19 janvier 1900).

  107. Millerand (1900) pp. 577–578. See also AN/F22/563 (1900–1912), La conférence de dimanche. La loi sur les heures de travail et la loi sur les accidents. Journal de Flers, 25 April 1900, Les lois ouvrières. Conférence faite par M. l’inspecteur du travail. Journal de Caen, 2 May 1900 and La conférence de M. l’inspecteur du travail. l’Echo républicain du Valois et de l’arrondissement de la Seine, 18 March 1900.

  108. Circulaire 19 janvier 1900, pp. 190–191.

  109. Beginning in 1894, Guesde and Vaillant authored several draft bills that were aimed at increasing the representation of workers within the inspectorate. See Guesde (1901) 2, pp. 219–234, 245–250 and ANFLT (1909) p. 72. As early as 1885, workers’ congresses began passing resolutions that called for the appointment of worker delegates. For further details, see Viet (1994) 1, p. 313, incl. n. 50; and Ariès (1998).

  110. Viet (1994) 1, p. 313.

  111. Millerand (1900) pp. 575–576 and ANFLT (1909) pp. 68–69.

  112. Between 1901 and 1905 eleven new inspectors of working-class origin were recruited into the service. See ANFLT (1909) p. 69. Prior to Millerand’s reforms (between 1892 and 1900) only 6.7 per cent of the inspectors had a parent of working-class or peasant origin. Between 1901 and 1914, that number increased to 50 per cent. See Donald Reid (1998) p. 117, incl. n. 15.

  113. Reid (1998) pp. 115–116.

  114. Viet (1998) p. 50 and Reid (1986) p. 73. For a different perspective, see Stewart (1989) p. 85.

  115. ILO (1923) p. 48.

  116. Hutchins and Harrison (1903) pp. 248–249.

  117. Ariès (1998) pp. 53–55.

  118. CIPLT (1901) pp. 529–530.

  119. Reid (1986) p. 75. For the prizes see Association normande pour prévenir les accidents du travail (1896) pp. 243–244.

  120. Viet (1994) 2, p. 454. The goal of weakening state inspection was made explicit at the founding meeting of the Association des industriels de France (1887). See AN/F12/ 4617 (1841–1892): Association des industriels de France pour préserver les ouvriers des accidents du travail. Compte rendu de l’assemblée générale du 6 avril 1887. Communication de M. Grüner. Paris: Imprimerie Chaix, 1887, pp. 16–19 and idem, Rapport du Conseil de Direction, pp. 3–7. For more on the major employer safety associations, including the Association des Industriels de France, see Billy (1902).

  121. See Billy (1902) p.104, 107–110. According to Billy, the Association des Industriels de France successfully pressured the ministry to revoke article 2 of the decree of 13 May 1893. This article required employers to place “full” protective shields over dangerous machinery.

  122. Ibid., pp. 112–113. Although smaller, the Association des Industriels du Nord had 440 members and “protected” 115,000 workers in 1902, so that the administration could not ignore it. In 1895, the Minister of Commerce invited the Association’s president (Ireland) to propose amendments to the decree of 10 March 1894. As inspector Jaracjewski made clear, the proposed amendments would have diminished the inspector’s ability to enforce the law. See ibid. and AN/F22/474 (1897–1904), Rapport de l’inspecteur divisionnaire, Jaracjewski (5e circumscription, Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Somme) [sur] le décret du 1[9?] mars 1894. Observations spéciales, n.d.

  123. Viet (1994) 2, pp. 454–462, Reid (1986) p. 75 and AN/F22/474 (1897–1904), Rapport de l’inspecteur divisionnaire, Jaracjewski. (5e circumscription, Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Somme) [sur] le décret du 1[0?] mars 1894. Observations générales. n.d.

  124. Viet (1994) 2, pp. 460–462 and Conférence de M. G. Dumont…12 février 1905 (1905) p. 47 (the figures are from this source and are for the year 1905). For more on the third association, the Association normande pour prévenir les accidents du travail, see Billy (1902) pp. 96–102. According to Billy, the Association normande had 250 members and protected 80,000 workers in 1902.

  125. According to one inspector (1901), the trade unions helped double the administrative capacities of the inspectorate. See Jay (1910) pp. 390–391 and Brodel (1911) pp. 54–59.

  126. Millerand’s circular of 19 January 1900 instructed the inspectors to establish contact with the bourses de travail and the local unions in their administrative division. However, the inspectors were discouraged from forging ties with unions that were not affiliated with the bourses de travail. For more details, see Viet (1994) 1, pp. 309–313.

  127. See, for instance, AN/F22/563 (1900–1912), Departmental Inspector to the Divisional Inspectors, Paris, 13 April 1900, for a discussion of Boulogne’s bourse de travail.

  128. The inspectors were well aware of this danger to their institutional autonomy. As one of them commented at a labor conference: “The inspector has to know how to defend the interests of workers without becoming an enemy of employers. His mission is both repressive and conciliatory (trans. mine).” See AN/F22/563 (1900–1912), Les lois ouvrières: Conférence faite par M. l’inspecteur du travail. Journal de Caen 2 (May 1990).

  129. See Reid (1998), Ariès (1998), Dèzes (1998), Dhoquois (1998) and Didry (1998).

  130. According to Reid, the inspectorate’s new institutional strength, obvious already in the early 1900s, became even more apparent during the inter-war period. See Reid (1986) p. 68, 75–76, 81 (quote on p. 81). See also Reid (1998) pp. 123–127.

  131. Reid (1986) pp. 80–81.

  132. Ibid. (quote on p. 81).

  133. Viet elaborates these views in his two-volume Les voltigeurs and in his essay “La formation de l’identité du corps des inspecteurs du travail (1874–1914),”in Robert (1998) pp. 42–51.

  134. See Viet (1998) esp. pp. 48–49, 51 (the term “moral contract” appears on p. 48) and Viet (1994) 1, esp. pp. 355–362.

  135. Viet (1994) and (1998).

  136. See Thomas (1948).

  137. International Labour Conference (1923) pp. 22–23, 70.

  138. Monnerais (1928) p. 17, 106–107. Thus, Monnerais observed that the inspectors successfully resolved 78 per cent of the labor disputes in 1925, far more than the 45 per cent resolved by justices of the peace. See ibid., pp. 132–133.

  139. Ibid., pp. 106–107, 128–129.

  140. Ibid., pp. 83–85, 129, 133–146.

  141. Price (1914) pp. 194–195.

  142. Marini (1936) pp. 95–97.

  143. Reid examines the inspectors had a conflictual relationship with national labor leaders. However, Reid does not assign too much significance to it. Like Viet, Reid views the inspectors’ efforts to forge coalitions with local labor leaders as having been more important for their institutional survival and long term success than their relationship with national labor leaders. See Reid (1986) p.80.

  144. During the sixteenth session of the Higher Labor Council (1906), the secretary of the federation of mechanics, Pierre Coupat, stated: “Nothing is as dangerous for the working classes as laws that are not enforced. If more and more workers profess anarchism, it is largely because the laws are not well enforced. If you want to regain the workers’ confidence in the law, inspection needs to be done seriously [my italics] and the number of inspectors needs to be increased (my translation).” See CST (1907a) p.198. Likewise, in 1907, during a legislative session devoted to protective labor legislation, the socialist politician Vaillant exclaimed: “No inspection, no law!” Quoted, ANFLT (1909) p. 5 (my translation).

  145. See, for example, statements by Pierre Coupat in CST (1907a) pp. 193–198 and Edmond Briat, a delegate of the federal committee of the bourses du travail and secretary of the union of precision tool workers. See ANFLT (1909) p. 287.

  146. See Coupat in CST (1907a) p. 198, Briat’s project to reform factory inspection in ANFLT (1909) pp. 287–292 and Stewart (1989) p. 86. See also statements by Claudius Denis (secretary of the Lyon weavers union), Guérard (secretary of the syndicate for railway workers) in CST (1907a) pp. 205–208 and Besset (secretary of the regional federation of the south-eastern workers’ unions) in CST (1907a) pp. 217–218.

  147. For example, the congress of Amiens (1906), the congress of textile workers, Tourcoing (1906), and Saint-Dié (1907). For more details, see Ariès (1998) p. 57 and Louis (1904) p. 246. See also the Statute of the Federation of Building Painters, art. 2, no. 6 in Léon de Seilhac (1903b) pp. 152–153 and the 1911 Charter of the Federation of Metal Workers in Louis (1947–48) 1, p. 245.

  148. Statement by Manoury in CST (1907a) p. 215 and Reid (1986) p. 77.

  149. Reid (1986) p. 77.

  150. As one employer (Mortier) made clear: “Until recently, I was partisan, within certain limits …to increase…the number of inspectors…Today, I am opposed to this increase [of factory inspectors], because I do not see them as enforcers of the law …as I understand it, but oppressors, enemies of liberty, and in order to protest the role that one wants to make them play [i.e., their cooperation with unions] I refuse to increase their numbers (my translation).” See CST (1907a) p. 193 (for quote). Mortier was the president of the Chamber of Commerce of Troyes. Another employer (Isaac) objected to the proposal to recruit trade union members into the inspectorate on the basis of competitive exams, arguing that “we [employers] want justice and you [workers] want class struggle and party warfare.” See CST (1907a) p. 228. Isaac was a silk manufacturer from Troyes. See also his statements in CST (1907a) pp. 199–204.

  151. CST (1907a) pp. 231–232.

  152. ANFLT (1909) p. 177. See also ibid., pp. 183–184. Petit’s proposal (ibid., p. 177) was worded as follows: “That the inspectors reject unconditionally the assistance of certain benevolent but irresponsible employers’ associations, and, thereby, assume full responsibility for their statutory surveillance duties (my translation).”

  153. Ibid., pp. 189. The Association adopted the more neutral resolution put forward by Arthur Fontaine (‘Directeur du Travail’ in the Ministry of Labor). Fontaine’s resolution was worded as follows: “If the opportunity arises, the inspectors are encouraged to cooperate with benevolent industrial hygiene and safety societies, without neglecting, however, their statutory surveillance duties, for which they alone assume entire responsibility (my translation).” See also ibid., pp. 177–189.

  154. ANFLT (1909) pp. 283–286.

  155. Selznick (1984 [1949]) p. 15. For a more systematic analysis of the role of unexpected consequences, see ibid., pp. 253–259.

  156. Ibid., p. 261.

  157. Ibid.

  158. As Reid has argued, the more reformist local union leaders had far more of an incentive to cooperate with the inspectors than their more radical, national counterparts. Cooperation with the inspectors enabled the former to enhance their bargaining leverage on the shop floor. See Reid (1986) p. 80.

  159. Selznick (1984 [1949]) pp. 15–16, 258–264 (quote p. 258). For an interesting discussion of the concept of goal displacement and its use by Michels, Lipset, and Selznick, see Blau and Meyer (1971) pp. 102–116, 120.

  160. Reid (1986) p. 76.

  161. AN/F22/563 (1900–1912), Departmental inspector (1st circumscription, Seine, 3d sect.) to the divisional inspector (1st circumscription, Seine), 3 January 1901. Figures for 1910–13, for example, indicate that about half of the complaints by individual workers were well founded. See Viet (1994) 1, table 19, p. 350.

  162. AN/F22/563 (1900–1912), Report of Paul Le Gouis, (departmental inspector, 6th circumscription, 1st sect.) to the Minister of Commerce, dated 21 February, 1901 and Stewart (1989) p. 85.

  163. Viet (1994) 1, pp. 326–328.

  164. AN/F22/563 (1900–1912): Weavers’ Union of Louviers to the Minister of Commerce, 1901, regarding Laurent (departmental inspector, 6th circumscription, 4th sect.); Correspondence between the Minister of Commerce and M. Jaraczewski (divisional inspector, 6th circumscription), [1?] and 8 April 1901; and Laurent to Jaracjewski, [n.d.]. See also in ibid. the letter from the Bourse du travail of Toulon to the Minister of Labor, 2 August 1910, requesting the dismissal of the local (departmental) factory inspector and Stewart (1989) pp. 84–86.

  165. A good example was inspector Louis Grillet from Rennes who entrusted his files to Paul Monnerais. In 1912–13, Grillet had visited over 2200 factories and workshops, drawn up 91 accidents reports, and held 45 conferences and 166 consultations with workers. His unofficial correspondence for 1912–1913 contained over 1,800 files related to his communications with local commissions, employers’, and workers’ associations. See Monnerais (1928) pp. 88–89, incl. n. 1.

  166. Reid (1986) esp. pp. 73–74, 76–80.

  167. See Reid (1986) pp. 72–74, 76. According to figures supplied by Reid, in 1899, the inspectors failed to extend protection to 31.5 per cent of workers, a majority of whom were employed in smaller enterprises (p. 74). About a decade later (1911), the percentage of workers whose work remained unregulated was roughly the same, i.e., 36 per cent. See Price (1914) pp. 195–196.

  168. See Viet (1994).

  169. See Balle (n.d.)

  170. Filoche (2003) p. 2. According to a satirical article published by Le Canard Enchaîné in May 2006, France is the country in which employers are least “harassed” by factory inspectors. The article also reported that the number of French inspectors is 30 per cent less than the European average. See Le MEDEF contrôle le renforcement de l’inspection du travail (2006). Concern over the present status quo has led Gérard Larcher, Minister of Employment, to unveil an ambitious plan to reform factory inspection (March 2006). See Ministère de l’emploi, de la cohesion sociale et du logement (2007). See also Ministère du travail, des relations sociales, et de la solidarité (2006).

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Peter Hall, Jeffrey Kopstein, Rudra Sil, and the Editors of Theory and Society for their useful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. I would also like to thank Daniel Béland, Mark Crowley, Michel Goyer, Katie Holt, Joshua Humphreys, Alice O’Connor, and Veljko Vujacic for commenting on a conference version of this article.

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  1. Department of Politics, Oberlin College, Oberlin, OH, USA

    Frieda Fuchs

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Fuchs, F. Historical legacies, institutional change, and policy leadership: the case of Alexandre Millerand and the French factory inspectorate. Theor Soc 39, 69–107 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-009-9094-4

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