Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

When Hyperpropositions Meet ...

  • Published:
Journal of Philosophical Logic Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

With each proposition P we associate a set of proposition (a hyperproposition) which determines the order in which one may retreat from accepting P, if one cannot fully hold on to P. We first describe the structure of hyperpropositions. Then we describe two operations on propositions, subtraction and merge, which can be modelled in terms of hyperpropositions. Subtraction is an operation that takes away part of the content of a proposition. Merge is an operation that determines the maximal consistent content of two propositions considered jointly. The merge operation gives rise to an inference relation which is, in a certain sense, optimally paraconsistent.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Da Costa, N. (1974): On the theory of inconsistent formalsystems, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 15: 497–510.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fuhrmann, A.(1997a): An Essay on Contraction, Stanford (CSLI).

  • Fuhrmann, A.(1997b): Solid belief, Theoria 63: 90–104.

  • Grove, A. (1988):Two modellings of theory change, J. Philos. Logic 17: 157–170.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansson, S. O. (1996): Non-prioritized belief change.

  • Hudson, J. L. (1975):Logical subtraction, Analysis 35: 130–135.

    Google Scholar 

  • Humberstone, L. (1981):Logical subtraction: Problems and prospects, Melbourne (typescript).

  • Jaeger, H.(1973): Action and subtraction, Philos. Review 82: 320–329.

    Google Scholar 

  • James, W. (1911): Lectures on Pragmatism, Longmans, Green, & Co., NewYork.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jaśkowski, S. (1969): A propositional calculus for inconsistent deductivesystems (1948), Studia Logica 24: 147–157.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lemmon, E. J. and D.S. Scott (1977): An Introduction to Modal Logic (The Lemmon Notes), ed. K. Segerberg, Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. K. (1973):Counterfactuals, Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. K. (1982): Logic forequivocators, Nous 16: 431–441.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindström, S. and W. Rabinowicz(1991): Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision, in: A. Fuhrmann and M. Morreau (ed.), The Logic of Theory Change, Springer, Berlin-New York, pp. 93–126.

    Google Scholar 

  • Priest, G. (1979): Logic ofParadox, J. Philos. Logic 8: 219–241.

    Google Scholar 

  • Segerberg, K. (1995): Beliefrevision from the point of view of doxastic logic, Bull. IGPL 3: 535–553.

    Google Scholar 

  • Segerberg, K. (1996): Further questions about hypertheories, in:S. Lindström et al. (eds.), Odds and Ends. Essays Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, Dept. of Philosophy, Uppsala, pp. 171–184.

    Google Scholar 

  • Segerberg, K.(199+): Irrevocable belief revision in dynamic doxastic logic, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, forthcoming.

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1953): PhilosophicalInvestigations, Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, 78 434, Konstanz, Germany

    André Fuhrmann

Authors
  1. André Fuhrmann
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Fuhrmann, A. When Hyperpropositions Meet .... Journal of Philosophical Logic 28, 559–574 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004792327149

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004792327149

Search

Navigation