Moral Agency, Self-Consciousness, and Practical Wisdom
This paper argues that self-consciousness and moral agency depend crucially on both embodied and social aspects of human existence, and that the capacity for practical wisdom, phronesis, is central to moral personhood. The nature of practical wisdom is elucidated by drawing on rival
analyses of expertise. Although ethical expertise and practical wisdom differ importantly, they are alike in that we can acquire them only in interaction with other persons and through habituation. The analysis of moral agency and practical wisdom is framed by Dennett's proposal that
moral personhood requires satisfaction of six conditions, including self-consciousness.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences, Colbourn Hall 411, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1352, USA, Email: [email protected]
Publication date: 01 January 2007
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