Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Review of Thomas Metzinger's Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003)

  • Published:
Brain and Mind

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

References

  • Baars, B. J., 1988: A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Block, N., 1995: On a confusion about a function of consciousness, Behav. Brain Sci. 18, 227–287.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. J., 1997: Availability: The cognitive basis of experience? in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. G¨uzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hume, D., 1739: In L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Raffman, D., 1995: On the persistence of phenomenology, in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic, Thoverton, UK.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University Hospital of Psychiatry, Zurich, Switzerland

    Alex Gamma

Authors
  1. Alex Gamma
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Gamma, A. Review of Thomas Metzinger's Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). Brain and Mind 4, 385–393 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:BRAM.0000005668.92894.01

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:BRAM.0000005668.92894.01

Search

Navigation