Abstract
In this paper we defend a version of moral internalism and a cognitivist account of motivation against recent criticisms. The internalist thesis we espouse claims that, if an agent believes she has reason to A, then she is motivated to A. Discussion of counter-examples has been clouded by the absence of a clear account of the nature of motivation. While we can only begin to provide such an account in this paper, we do enough to show that our version of internalism can be defended against putative counter-examples. All theories of motivation which take what motivates to be a psychological state run foul of the following plausible constraint: the reason why you ought to do an action and the reason why you do it can be the same. In our view, however, while what motivates is a reason (which is a fact) the state of being motivated is a cognitive stage, viz. the belief that one has reason to act. In cases where the agent's relevant beliefs are false, then she has no reason to act, but nontheless her action can be explained in other ways.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Brink, D., Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Dancy, J., Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
Dancy, J., Why there is really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 95 (1995), pp. 1–18.
Korsgaard, C., Skepticism about Practical Reason, Journal of Philosophy, 83 (1986), pp. 5–25.
Little, M., Virtue as Knowledge: Objects from the Philosophy of Mind, Nous, 31(1) (1997), pp. 59–79.
McDowell, J., Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. Vol. 52 (1978), pp. 13–29.
McNaughton, D., Moral Vision. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988.
Mele, A., Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes, The Philosophical Review, 104(3) (1995), pp. 387–423.
Nagel, T., The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978.
Parfit, D., Reasons and Motivation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. Vol. 71 (1997), pp. 99–130.
Smith, M., The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
Williams, B.A.O., Internal and External Reasons, in R. Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Reprinted in Williams (1981), pp. 101–113.
Williams, B.A.O., Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Woods, M., Reasons for Action and Desire, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. Vol. 46 (1972), pp. 189–201.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Garrard, E., McNaughton, D. Mapping Moral Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1, 45–59 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009925220105
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009925220105