The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion

Abstract

Although it is widely recognized that David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) belongs among the greatest works of philosophy, there is little agreement about the correct way to interpret his fundamental intentions. Among almost all commentators it is an established orthodoxy that skepticism and naturalism are the two dominant themes in this work. The difficulty has been, however, that Hume's skeptical arguments and commitments appear to undermine and discredit his naturalistic ambition to contribute to "the science of man"-a schism that appears to leave his entire project broken-backed. The solution to this riddle depends on challenging another, closely related, point of orthodoxy: namely, that before Hume published the Treatise he removed almost all material concerned with problems of religion. This book argues, contrary to this view, that irreligious aims and objectives are fundamental to the Treatise and account for its underlying unity and coherence. Hume's basic anti-Christian aims and objectives serve to shape and direct both his skeptical and naturalistic commitments. When Hume's arguments are viewed from this perspective we can not only solve puzzles arising from his discussion of various specific issues, we can also explain the intimate and intricate connections that hold his entire project together. The irreligious interpretation provides a comprehensive and fresh account of the nature of Hume's fundamental aims and ambitions in the Treatise. It also presents a radically different picture of the way in which Hume's project was rooted in the debates and controversies of his own time, placing the Treatise in an irreligious or anti-Christian philosophical tradition that includes Hobbes, Spinoza, and their freethinking followers. Considered in these terms, Hume's Treatise constitutes the crowning achievement of the Radical Enlightenment.