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FREGEAN SENSE AND RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS

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  1. Schlossbergstrasse 65, Bingen/Rhein, 55411, Germany

    Richard Gaskin

  2. University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9QN, England

    Richard Gaskin

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Gaskin, R. FREGEAN SENSE AND RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS. Philosophical Studies 86, 131–154 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017929320501

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