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The Covering Law Model Applied to Dynamical Cognitive Science: A Comment on Joel Walmsley

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Abstract

In a 2008 paper, Walmsley argued that the explanations employed in the dynamical approach to cognitive science, as exemplified by the Haken, Kelso and Bunz model of rhythmic finger movement, and the model of infant preservative reaching developed by Esther Thelen and her colleagues, conform to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological model of explanation (also known as the covering law model). Although we think Walmsley’s approach is methodologically sound in that it starts with an analysis of scientific practice rather than a general philosophical framework, we nevertheless feel that there are two problems with his paper. First, he focuses only on the deductivenomological model and so neglects the important fact that explanations are causal. Second, the explanations offered by the dynamical approach do not take the deductive-nomological format, because they do not deduce the explananda from exceptionless laws. Because of these two points, Walmsley makes the dynamical explanations in cognitive science appear problematic, while in fact they are not.

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Notes

  1. Throughout this article, we will assume an interventionist account of causality along the lines of Woodward (2003): rather than the underlying causal mechanisms, we are concerned with causes as difference-makers that we can manipulate.

  2. Walmsley mentions these and some other counterexamples we will consider in notes 33 and 34 of his 2008 article.

  3. Returning to the example of the flagpole, if we change the angle of elevation of the sun, then this leaves the height of the flagpole unchanged: these two variables are independent from each other, hence, according to the principle of independent alterability, the genuine explanation is the one with the length of the shadow as explanans. However, the reverse no longer holds: having changed the angle of elevation of the sun, we can no longer work out the length of the flagpole, for the length of the shadow changes with the intervention and so we are missing a key element in the derivation. These two variables are not independent; therefore, the second case does not constitute a genuine explanation.

  4. Again, this point extends beyond dynamical cognitive science to all special sciences (perhaps even to physics). Here is a quote from Carl Craver making the same point about neuroscience: “Neuroscience is driven by two goals. One goal […] is explanation […] The second goal of neuroscience is to control the brain and the central nervous system. Neuroscience is driven in large part by the desire to diagnose and treat diseases, to repair brain damage, to enhance brain function, and to prevent the brain’s decay” (2007, p. 1).

References

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Acknowledgments

The research for this paper was supported by the Research Fund Flanders (FWO) through project nr. G.0031.09. The authors thank Huib Looren de Jong and Maarten Van Dyck for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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Correspondence to Raoul Gervais.

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Gervais, R., Weber, E. The Covering Law Model Applied to Dynamical Cognitive Science: A Comment on Joel Walmsley. Minds & Machines 21, 33–39 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9216-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9216-9

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