Skip to main content
Log in

Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

I pursue an answer to the psychological question “what is it for S to presuppose that p?” I will not attempt a general answer. Rather, I will explore a particular kind of presuppositions that are constituted by the mental act of reasoning: Inferential presuppositions. Indeed, I will consider a specific kind of inferential presuppositions—one that is constituted by a specific reasoning competence: The univocality competence. Roughly, this is the competence that reliably governs the univocal thought-components’ operation as univocal in a line of reasoning. I will argue that the exercise of this reasoning competence constitutes certain inferential presuppositions. More specifically, I outline a conception of an inferential presupposition as a non-attitudinal but genuinely psychological and rationally committing relation that holds between a reasoner and a proposition. Thus, inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from tacit or standing attitudes that function as premise-beliefs in reasoning. Likewise inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from other kinds of presuppositions. In conclusion, I note some features of inferential presuppositions that bear on the epistemology of inference.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The notion of presupposition has received more treatment in linguistics and philosophy of language than in the philosophy of mind and psychology. However, in a classic paper Robert Stalnaker argued that utterance and sentence presuppositions derive from an account of what it is to presuppose that p psychologically speaking (Stalnaker 1973).

  2. The notion of univocality will be discussed below. However, the term ‘univocal’ should provide a rough idea as it is derived from the Latin univocus that means, approximately, “having the same meaning.” Of course, the issue here is thought-components rather than linguistic items.

  3. An anonymous referee notes that a probabilistic turn has occurred in the psychology of reasoning (see, e.g., Oaksford and Chater 2009; Over 2009). In this paper, I restrict the discussion to purportedly deductive reasoning (for more on this notion, see Gerken 2007a Chap. II and Gerken 2011). Most cognitive psychologists will grant that humans are capable of reasoning in accordance with deductive inference rules since this assumption is compatible with the view that the default or natural mode of reasoning should be modeled by a probabilistic rather than deductive framework.

    However, any theory of reasoning should account for inferential presuppositions and conceptual equivocation, and it would be very interesting to investigate how the notion of inferential presuppositions discussed here would fit into a credence-based probabilistic account. But such an investigation lies outside the scope of the present paper.

  4. The term ‘middle term’ [gr. ‘meson’] goes back to Aristotle who introduced in it the Prior Analytics.

  5. I use underlining to mention mental items such as concepts and beliefs. Linguistic items such as words and sentences are mentioned by single quotes.

  6. For simplicity of exposure, I shall ignore in this discussion the fact that the univocality-competence must also be exercised with regard to the thought-components lead, element and is. The latter is to ensure that she does not use is as the copula in one premise-belief and the “is of identity” or the “is of constitution” in another premise-belief.

  7. To see this, imagine that someone is rehearsing for an exam and is simply recollecting the respective beliefs in turn and happens to do so in a succession that corresponds to a modus ponens inference although she does not realize this.

  8. Since ‘redeploy’ is a success term and non-univocal concepts may operate as if they were univocal, I prefer the phrase ‘operate as univocal.’ Moreover, ‘redeploy’ may encourage misguided higher-order accounts.

  9. I also assume that it is psychologically possible to think (Gold 1)–(Gold 3) in succession although the occurrence of (Gold 3) is not explained by a matching bias (see, e.g., Evans 1998, 2003). More generally, the present discussion is restricted to cases in which neither reasoning nor psychological biases are responsible for the generation of the string of the thoughts (Gold 1)–(Gold 3). I think the latter restriction is reasonable given the former. After all, matching bias is typically seen as a bias of reasoning. Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting this restriction.

  10. Ludwig Wittgenstein noted this connection in the midst of his rule-following considerations: “The word ‘agreement’ [Übereinstimmung] and the word ‘rule’ are related to one another, they are cousins.” (Wittgenstein 1953, § 224. My translation). “The use of the word ‘rule’ and the use of the word ‘same’ [Gleich] are interwoven. (Like the use of ‘proposition’ [Satz] with the use of ‘true.’)” (Ibid. § 225. My translation).

    The metaphors ‘cousin’ and ‘interwoven’ are not directly explicated. Biographical note: I came upon Wittgenstein’s remarks after developing the account I am in the process of outlining.

  11. There may be exceptions. But note that even an application of the rule of existential generalization from the premise-belief Water is tasteless to the conclusion-belief Something is tasteless is not a counter-example. It requires that the two occurrences of the thought-component, tasteless, are operating as univocal.

  12. In the linguistic rather than mental realm, David Kaplan famously eschewed the type-token terminology in favor of the character-content terminology (Kaplan 1989). For some apparatus to deal with the demonstrative aspects of de re belief, see Burge (2005, 2009).

  13. For the purpose of illustration, I simplify Campbell’s approach which proceeds via “object-dependent senses.”

  14. For more on reasoning with empty concepts, see Gerken (2007b).

  15. Lawlor has come to replace the idea of purported co-reference with a notion of notational content (Lawlor 2007).

  16. Well-functioning fallibility is characterized in terms of entailment. A cognitive competence is well-functioning fallible just in case optimal performance of it does not entail that it fulfills its cognitive function. In contrast, Burge does not characterize brute error in terms of entailment although his characterizations are compatible with this idea.

  17. I discuss the idea of well-functioning fallibility in much greater detail in (Gerken 2007a, Chap. II.viii.a).

  18. Some theorists use the term ‘confusion’ (cf. Camp 2002; Lawlor 2007; Millikan 2000). I reserve ‘confusion’ for cases in which the equivocation is due to irrationality or sub-optimal performance. So, if equivocation may be rational (as I have argued that it may), not all equivocation cases are confusion cases (Gerken 2007a, 2009, 2011).

  19. I will not argue against attitudinal accounts of univocal reasoning and inferential presuppositions on this occasion—although I do so in (Gerken 2007a, Chap. II).

  20. I invoke some points from the theory of material constitution. But the putative differences of between the material and the psychological/rational realm should be explored. My aim here is to begin, rather than to complete, the exploration of the idea that the exercise of a competence may constitute presuppositions.

  21. Of course, one should not believe that modus tollens is a terrible inference-rule in any circumstance. But the reasoning gives rise to a normative commitment to the instance of the rule which is relevant for the reasoning.

  22. Camp’s example may be flawed since it may be better understood as only involving linguistic equivocation but not acquisition of distinct concepts. But for the purpose of illustration, assume that Herbert acquires two distinct concepts.

  23. For example, it may be inapt to account for Moore-style reasoning in which warrant for the premises (e.g., I have a hand) seems to be incapable of providing warrant for the conclusion (e.g., the external world exists). Thanks to Adam Carter for raising this issue.

  24. David Kaplan taught me, over a memorable cup of coffee when I was still a visiting undergraduate at UCLA, that when one says “David is David”, the form of one’s statement may be ‘a = a’ or ‘a = b’. In some cases, one has no a priori guarantee that the sentence is of the form is ‘a = a’—even when it is of the form ‘a = a’. One could mistake two orthographically or phonetically identical but nevertheless distinct names to be one and the same (Kaplan 1991). A somewhat similar point is relevant to the true identity-presuppositions that I posit. There are cases in which one’s presupposition is of the right form although one has no a priori guarantee that one is not equivocating. The ascription of the specific identity proposition appears to be trivial “from above.” But it marks the fact that the reasoner has no guarantee that her reasoning does not involve equivocating.

  25. Notice, however, that my account is compatible with Stalnaker’s conception of enthymematic reasoning as involving tacit (unconscious) attitudes as premises. I am merely advocating a notion of inferential presupposition that is distinct in kind from tacit premise-attitudes. It should also be noted that some of Stalnaker’s other characterizations are closer to the present account. For Stalnaker’s most recent remarks on presuppositions, see Stalnaker (2008, forthcoming).

  26. Pun intended. While not much of a pun, it is true that some philosophers have used the notion of a presupposition in a way that normatively commits them certain views about its nature and significance. For a fairly explicit discussion of the epistemological relevance of inferential presuppositions, see the exchange between Robert Stalnaker and Paul Boghossian (Stalnaker 2008, forthcoming, Boghossian forthcoming). For other views on how inferential presuppositions relate to Boghossian’s slow-switch case, see Brown (2004), Burge (2005), Gerken (2007a, 2011) and Lawlor (2001).

  27. The familiar distinction between doxastic and propositional warrant has been developed in order to be able to provide an epistemic assessment of an agent’s epistemic relation to a proposition that she does not believe. I use ‘warrant’ as a general non-factive epistemically good property following (Burge 2003, Gerken forthcoming).

  28. Thinkers with very short attention spans come to mind.

  29. I reemphasize that this epistemological application is sketched very roughly for illustration. For the original slow-switch challenge, see Boghossian (1992, 1994). For a more detailed answer, see Gerken (2007a, 2009, 2011).

  30. Of course, any attempt to generalize the account faces the danger of overgeneralization. The fact that the infant drinks the milk may only be said to constitute a presupposition that milk is nourishing in a derivative sense, at best. The baby is hardly normatively committed to the proposition that milk is nourishing in virtue of drinking it. One reason, I suspect, is that the baby does not exercise a cognitive competence associated with reason. Perhaps, then, the account should be restricted to the exercise of cognitive competences associated with reason.

References

  • Boghossian, P. (1992). Externalism and inference. Philosophical issues, 2, Rationality in Epistemology, pp. 11–28.

  • Boghossian, P. (1994). The transparency of mental content. Philosophical perspectives, 8, Logic and Language, pp. 33–50.

  • Boghossian, P. (Forthcoming). The transparency of mental content revisited. Philosophical studies.

  • Brown, J. (2004). Anti-individualism and knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (1988). Individualism and self-knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, 85(11), 649–663.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (1996). Our entitlement to self-knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, 91–116.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (2003). Perceptual entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67, 503–548.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (2005). Disjunctionism and perceptual psychology. Philosophical Topics, 33(1), 1–78.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (2009) Five theses on de re states and attitudes. In J. Almog & P. Leonardi (Eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Camp, J. L. (2002). Confusion: A study in the theory of knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, J. (1987). Is sense transparent? Aristotelian society supplementary volume LXI, pp. 273–292.

  • Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Evans, J. S. B. T. (1998). Matching bias in conditional reasoning: Do we understand it after 25 years? Thinking and Reasoning, 4(1), 45–110.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003). In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning. TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, 7(10), 454–459.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gerken, M. (2007a). Epistemic reasoning and the mental. UCLA Dissertation.

  • Gerken, M. (2007b). A false dilemma for anti-individualism. American Philosophical Quarterly, 44(4), 329–342.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gerken, M. (2009). Conceptual equivocation and epistemic relevance. Dialectica, 63(2), 117–132.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gerken, M. (2011): Conceptual equivocation and warrant by reasoning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Published online, June 4th 2010.

  • Gerken, M. (Forthcoming). Internalism and externalism in the epistemology of testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

  • Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, et al. (Eds.), Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D. (1991). Words. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 69, 93–119.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawlor, K. (2001). New thoughts about old things: Cognitive policies as the ground of singular concepts. New York: Garland Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawlor, K. (2005). Confused thought and modes of presentation. The Philosophical Quarterly, 55(218), 21–37.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lawlor, K. (2007). A notational worlds approach to confusion. Mind and Language, 22(2), 150–172.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R. (1993). On mentalese orthography. In White queen psychology and other essays for Alice. A Bradford Book. Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 103–122.

  • Millikan, R. (1997). Images of identity. Mind, 106, 499–519.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R. (2000). On clear and confused concepts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2009). Precis of Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 69–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Over, D. E. (2009). New paradigm psychology of reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 15(4), 431–438.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker, R. (1973). Presuppositions. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2, 447–457.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker, R. (2008). Our knowledge of the internal world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker, R. (Forthcoming). Responses to Stoljar, Weatherson and Boghossian. Philosophical Studies.

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

The article is drawn from Chapter II of my UCLA dissertation ‘Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental.’ My advisor was Tyler Burge and I am greatly indebted for his advice. I am also grateful for advice and help from Julie Brummer, Johan Gersel, Erica Gielow, Andrew Hsü, David Kaplan, Krista Lawlor, Luca Struble as well as from the referees who provided helpful and constructive reports. Moreover, I am grateful to audiences at Danish Philosophy Society Annual meeting (Århus, 2009) and a SERG workshop at the University of Copenhagen (2009). Dedicated to Else.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mikkel Gerken.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Gerken, M. Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions. Erkenn 76, 373–394 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9281-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9281-3

Keywords

Navigation