Abstract
An argument can be superficially valid and rhetorically effective even if what is plausibly meant, what is derived from what, and how it is derived is not at all clear. An example of such an argument is provided by Socrates’s famous refutation of Euthyphro’s second definition of holy, which is generally regarded as clearly valid and successful. This paper provides a stricter logical analysis than the ones in the literature. In particular, it is shown that the argument contains a syntactically ambiguous expression, a passage that needs to be read charitably, and a previously unnoticed but crucial shift between two notions of unholy. Different analyses may be provided, depending on how these interpretation problems are solved. The conditions under which the refutation is valid and successful are far from obvious, and are here explicitly specified.
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Notes
Elenchus and reductio cannot be identified with each other. Elenchus qua dialectic strategy involves two parties, with one challenging the other’s thesis. So it may involve a reductio, but the rejection of the challenged thesis can be pursued in various ways. Two different ways are indicated in Robinson’s quote in Sect. 1. More recently Walton (2007: 50) emphasizes the dialogical form of the Socratic elenchus and claims that various components, not only the epistemic, may have a relevant role in dialogues. We hold that elenchi have an epistemic goal—be it the discovery of truths/falsities or, as held by Benson (2000), the consistency assessment—and we shall stress that the means used by one party to achieve such a goal might be quite effective in persuading the other, even though they may not always be transparent.
This is a perspective that in recent times has been more or less explicitly adopted in using ontology to provide a common, generally accepted foundation of terminology in the field of knowledge representation (see Guarino 2009 for a survey).
This might suggest that something stipulative is involved, but clearly the definiens is not chosen arbitrarily. The ontological target is supposed to be unique and accessible under certain conditions which are partly determined by the nature of the target itself. From a point of view that is largely negative towards the metaphysical conception of real definitions, Robinson (1954: 155) emphasizes this aspect by saying that ‘essence […] is just the human choice of what to mean by a name’. More positively, when a real definition is seen as the introduction of an improved concept, he says: ‘every improvement of a concept carries along with it a stipulative redefinition of the word expressing the concept’ (1954: 187).
More on stipulative definitions in note 12.
All the quotations of Euthyphro are from Gallop (1997).
We do not make any extensional difference between the negation of ‘is holy’, i.e. ‘is not holy’, and the negation of ‘holy’, i.e. ‘non-holy’, so that the class of things that are not holy coincides with the class of things that are non-holy.
Some commentators attach no importance to the distinction between ‘unholy’ as ‘not loved by the gods’ and ‘unholy’ as ‘hated by the gods’ (see, e.g., Dancy 2004: 125). This view might be indirectly supported by pointing out that attitudes such as disliking/disagreeing can be communicated by denying liking/agreeing. Yet even in actual communication not loving is usually not felt to imply hating. Furthermore, there is no hint that Socrates assumes, or thinks that Euthyphro assumes, that everything is either loved or hated by the gods.
The passage might suggest something stronger, i.e. that for every thing some gods consider it just and others consider it unjust. But disagreement is not previously presented as concerning all things; so it is natural to read the passage charitably, as if Socrates were speaking only of the things the gods disagree on.
As in Gallop (1997), these expressions have been hyphenated to signal that they are translations of single Greek words, theophiles and theomises, meaning ‘what is loved by the gods’ and ‘what is hated by the gods’, respectively.
See Dancy (2004: 131-2) for an account—albeit not fully perspicuous—of Socrates’s reaction.
For, as Robinson (1954: 60) says, ‘a stipulative definition stipulates that, whatever the word may mean in other communications or even in earlier parts of this communication, it is for the rest of this communication to be taken as having no meaning whatever except the one now stipulated. Any previous meanings are thereby abolished for the remainder of this communication. The element of deliberate, arbitrary, selfconscious choice of a name for a certain thing, or of a thing for a certain name, is the essential and constant element in what I am calling “stipulative definition”’.
Socrates also rejects the definition of ‘holy’ as ‘loved by all gods’, but not for logical reasons. He argues that the fact that the holy things are holy explains why gods love them, and not vice versa, as we would have expected were the definition adequate (9d–11b). We will not consider this important and widely commented further elenchus.
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We thank two anonymous referees for their comments and insights, which helped us to improve the manuscript.
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Giaretta, P., Spolaore, G. Validity and Effectiveness of Ambiguity: A Famous Argument by Socrates. Argumentation 26, 393–407 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-012-9267-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-012-9267-6