Abstract
A world without individual entities? An advice to not to extract immediate ontological consequences from quantum theory. Should we assume a world without individual entities? I pledge not to extract immediate ontological consequences from quantum theory. My intention is to focus on the complexity of ontological concepts commonly associated with quantum theory. Using as an example the compatibility of EPR correlations with the existence of individual entities, it is shown that an absolute rejection of an ontological category, based on some aspects of the formalism of quantum theory, does not seem reasonable. A consequence of this argument is that the common sense view – the world is composed of individual entities – can be maintained, despite of the particularities of quantum mechanics.
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Gil, F.J.S. Eine Welt ohne Individuelle EntitÄten?. J Gen Philos Sci 35, 331–349 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-004-1474-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-004-1474-x