Hume Studies

Hume Studies Volume XXVI, Number 1, April 2000, pp. 87-108 Hume's Progressive View of Human Nature MICHAEL GILL In the introduction to the Treatise, Hume maintains that scientific advance will come only through an accurate and comprehensive conception of human nature. He praises "some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing" and declares his intention to build upon their work (T xvii).1 How much of the "science of man" that Hume goes on to develop is a recapitulation of the work of the other British philosophers and how much is new? When is Hume borrowing the insights of those who came before and when is he innovating? It is difficult to answer these questions, and not just because the rules of attribution in the eighteenth century were looser than in ours. For at times the verve with which Hume writes can lead one to think that he is in the grip of a new discovery, when he is in fact recounting the ideas of a predecessor. And at other times Hume puts others' ideas to work in a manner that they themselves never considered or would have actively opposed. There can be no doubt, however, that Hume does put forth new ideas, and some of them, I think, must be counted real advances on what came before. In this paper I will elucidate one such advance—the development of what I will call a progressive view of human nature. This view will stand out clearly when we place Hume's Treatise account of the virtue of justice against the backdrop of a dispute on the origin of human sociability between Shaftesbury, Mandeville, and Hutcheson, three of the five "late philosophers in England." For while a number of the pieces of Hume's account appear in the work of his Michael Gill is at the Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston, 66 George Street, Charleston, SC 29424-0001, USA. e-mail: gillm@cofc.edu 88 Michael Gill three predecessors, Hume's combination of them is novel, and in the end constitutes a significant "improvement in the science of man" (T xvii). In the first section, I outline the dispute between Mandeville, on the one hand, and Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, on the other. In the second section, I show that there are significant respects in which Hume's account of justice is in agreement with Mandeville and in disagreement with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. In the third section, I show that there are other significant respects in which Hume's account is in agreement with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and in disagreement with Mandeville. In the fourth section, I explain how Hume's combination of these two different aspects results in a new and improved view of human nature, one that is dynamic or progressive where that of his predecessors was static or originalist. I conclude, in the fifth section, by noting some problems with Hume's account of justice and suggesting how attention to Hume's progressive view might mitigate them. I Human beings are sociable. They seek out company, live together "in Multitudes" (Mandeville I 41),2 undertake large cooperative endeavors, and act in ways that benefit others. They are not solitary creatures engaged in perpetual warfare. On this point Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Mandeville all agree. Where Mandeville disagrees with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson is on the origin of human sociability. For while Shaftesbury and Hutcheson believe that human sociability originates in natural benevolence, Mandeville believes that it originates in self-interest. Shaftesbury points to our friendships and our morals as compelling evidence of our natural benevolence. We all prefer "Company" to "Solitude," he says, and "almost all our Pleasures" are built upon "mutual Converse" and "Society" (Shaftesbury's Inquiry 63).3 The aspect of friendship that gives us the most pleasure of all, moreover, is being benevolent or "doing good" to our friends (Characteristics II 36).4 But to be virtuous is to be benevolent or to "do good" to the human species as a whole, which is just to be a "friend of mankind" (Characteristics II 37). This is why being virtuous provides us with such pleasure—because...