Abstract
The running debate between Peter Achinstein and his critics concerning the nature of scientific evidence is misguided as each side attempts to explicate a distinct notion of evidence. Achinstein's approach, however, is valuable in helping to point out a problem with Carnap's statistical relevance model. By claiming an increase in probability to be necessary for evidence, the received view is incapable of accounting for evidence which is statistically irrelevant but explanatorily relevant. A broader view of evidence which can account for pragmatic concerns such as explanation is thereby required.
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Gimbel, S. Peirce Snatching: Towards a More Pragmatic View of Evidence. Erkenntnis 51, 207–231 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005465225262
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005465225262