Abstract
Behavioral economics has rejuvenated economic theory and deepened the bonds between economic theory and the other social sciences. Neoclassical economics does not depend on individual preferences being self-regarding. Moreover, in market contexts, laboratory experiments indicate that traditional theory works well. Behavioral economic findings thus enrich and expand neoclassical economics rather than undermining it. In particular, social norms are an emergent property of human sociality, and exist as macrosocial structures that are not reducible to the preferences of individuals. Behavioral economists are not theorists, but rather experimentalists. With few exceptions, they do not provide, nor aim to provide, cogent models for the phenomena they discover. Far from downplaying “inconvenient facts,” as is the practice of traditional economic theory, behavioral economists relish finding novel forms of individual decision-making and strategic behavior.
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Gintis, H. The future of behavioral game theory. Mind Soc 10, 97–102 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-011-0091-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-011-0091-8