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The role of pragmatic rules in the conjunction fallacy

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Abstract

We here report the findings of our investigation into the validity of the “conjunction fallacy” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), bearing in mind the role of conversational rules. Our first experiment showed that subjects found a logically correct answer unacceptable when it implied a violation of the conversational rules.

We argue that tautological questions, such as those which concern the relationship of inclusion between a class and its sub-class, violate conversational rules because they are not informative. In this sense, it is not understood that the question in a Linda-type problem involves a comparison between an inclusive and included class, but presumed that a different type of comparison is intended.

Tautological questions (and, consequently, also their answers) do not become a matter of discussion except under certain specific conditions. Our second experiment showed that, providing the context was adequately marked (such as in the case of a rhetorical question), the conjunction fallacy disappears.

In two further experiments, the implications of our view were compared with those of the other critical approaches to the heuristic programme: the classical pragmatic view (which we call logical complementarity) and the frequentist view.

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Mosconi, G., Macchi, L. The role of pragmatic rules in the conjunction fallacy. Mind & Society 2, 31–57 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02512074

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