Abstract
Non-actual model systems discussed in scientific theories are compared to fictions in literature. This comparison may help with the understanding of similarity relations between models and real-world target systems. The ontological problems surrounding fictions in science may be particularly difficult, however. A comparison is also made to ontological problems that arise in the philosophy of mathematics.
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Notes
The account given here is not a contribution to the “semantic view of theories,” which aims to give a uniform analysis of all theorizing and draws on either the logician's notion of a model, or something closely related to it (Suppe 1977; Van Fraassen 1980; Lloyd 1988; French & Ladyman 1999). But elements of the view will also be assessed in a modified role at the end of the paper.
Information on the New Orleans model can be found at: http://chl.erdc.usace.army.mil/chl.aspx?p=s&a=Projects;207. I am grateful to Susan Sterrett for introducing me to this example, and to both Sterrett and Michael Weisberg for information about the contemporary use of physical models.
For presentations of this idea see Godfrey-Smith (2006a); Frigg (forthcoming); Thomson-Jones (forthcoming).
Or, often, we are looking for the instantiation of nearby determinates of the same determinable (Thomson-Jones forthcoming).
Klein (forthcoming) calls these “quasi-idealizations.” He distinguishes these from from (genuinely) idealized models which cannot be seen as representations of particular real systems because so much that is causally important in those systems is altered or omitted.
“In a contest for sheer systematic utility to science, the notion of physical object still leads the field. On this score alone, therefore, one might still put a premium on explanations that appeal to physical objects and not to abstract ones, even if abstract objects be grudgingly admitted too for their efficacy elsewhere in the theory.” (Quine 1960, p. 238).
Giere (forthcoming) discusses the problem but uses a weaker, physically grounded, sense of “impossible” than this, so some entities he discusses as impossible I treat here as possible.
Brock (2002) argues that some kinds of fictional realism do not have this problem: only the more “concrete” kinds, not the ones that treat fictional objects as real but abstract.
The problem would be avoided if infinitesimal values of probability were allowed. I am grateful to Alan Hájek for assistance with this example.
This idea is discussed in more detail in Godfrey-Smith (2006b).
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Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Mark Colyvan, Warren Goldfarb, Alan Hájek, Arnon Levy, Martin Thomson-Jones and Michael Weisberg for comments and assistance.
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Godfrey-Smith, P. Models and fictions in science. Philos Stud 143, 101–116 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9313-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9313-2