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How Not To Have an Ontology of Physical OBJECTS

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REFERENCES

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific University, Seattle, WA, 98119, USA

    P. Goggans

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  1. P. Goggans
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Goggans, P. How Not To Have an Ontology of Physical OBJECTS. Philosophical Studies 94, 295–308 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004279812072

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