Skip to main content
Log in

Possibly v. actually the case: Davidson’s omniscient interpreter at twenty

  • Philosophy Of Language
  • Published:
Acta Analytica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The publication of Davidson 2001, anthologizing articles from the 1980s and 1990s, encourages reconsidering arguments contained in them. One such argument is Davidson’s omniscient-interpreter argument (‘OIA’) in Davidson 1983. The OIA allegedly establishes that it is necessary that most beliefs are true. Thus the omniscient interpreter, revived in 2001 and now 20 years old, was born to answer the skeptic. In Part I of this paper, I consider charges that the OIA establishes only that it is possible that most beliefs are true; if correct, then it is also possibly the case that most beliefs are false—the skeptic’s very position. Next, I consider two responses on Davidson’s behalf, showing that each fails. In Part II, I show that the OIA establishes neither that it is necessarily merely possibly but actually the case that most beliefs are true. I then conclude that this is enough to answer the skeptic.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Brueckner, A.L. 1991: ‘The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again’, Analysis 51, 199–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. 1973: ‘Radical Interpretation’, Dialectica 27, 313–328, reprinted in Davidson 1984: 125–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • —— 1974a: ‘Belief and the Basis of Meaning’, Synthese 27, 309–23, reprinted in Davidson 1984: 141–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • —— 1974b: ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47, 5–20, reprinted in Davidson 1984: 183–198.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • —— 1975: ‘Thought and Talk’, in Mind and language, S. Guttenplan (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 7–23, reprinted in Davidson 1984: 155–70.

    Google Scholar 

  • —— 1977a: ‘The Method of Truth in Metaphysics’, in Studies in the Philosophy of Language, P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, Jr., and H.K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 2., Morris, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 244–54, reprinted in Davidson 1984: 199–214.

    Google Scholar 

  • —— 1982: ‘Rational Animals’, Dialectica 36, 317–27, reprinted in Davidson 2001: 95–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • —— 1983: ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, in Kant oder Hegel, D. Heinrich (ed.), Stuttgart, Germany: Klett-Cotta, 423–38, reprinted in Davidson 2001, 137–53.

    Google Scholar 

  • —— 1984: Inquiries into truth and interpretation, New York: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • —— 1990: ‘Meaning, Truth and Evidence’, in Perspectives on Quine, R. Barrett and Roger Gibson (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 68–79.

    Google Scholar 

  • —— 1991a: ‘Epistemology Externalized’, Dialectica 45, 191–202, reprinted in Davidson 2001: 193–204.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • —— 1991b: ‘Three Varieties of Knowledge’, in A.J. Ayer: Memorial Essays, A.P. Griffiths (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy, Supplement 30, New York: Cambridge University Press, 153–66, reprinted in Davidson 2001: 205–20.

    Google Scholar 

  • —— 1992: ‘The Second Person’, in The Wittgenstein Legacy, P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, Jr., H.K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 17, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 255–67, reprinted in Davidson 2001: 107–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • —— 1998: ‘The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self’, in Philosophie in synthetischer absicht, Marcelo Stamm (ed.), Stuttgart, Germany: Klett-Cotta, reprinted in Davidson 2001, 85–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • —— 1999: ‘The Emergence of Thought’, Erkenntnis 51, 7–17, reprinted in Davidson 2001, 123–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • —— 2001: Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eldridge, R. 1986: ‘Metaphysics and the Interpretation of Persons: Davidson on Thinking and Conceptual Schemes’, Synthese 66, 477–503.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foley, R., and R. Fumerton. 1985: ‘Davidson’s Theism?’, Philosophical Studies 48, 83–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Genova, A.C. 1999: ‘The Very Idea of Massive Truth’, in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, L.E. Hahn (ed.), The Library of Living Philosophers 27, Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 167–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gettier, E.L. 1963: ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis 23, 121–3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W.V.O. 1960: Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Goldberg, N. Possibly v. actually the case: Davidson’s omniscient interpreter at twenty. Acta Anal 18, 143–160 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-003-1018-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-003-1018-8

Keywords

Navigation