Abstract
Traditionally, liberals have confined religion to the sphere of the ‘private’ or ‘non-political’. However, recent debates over the place of religious symbols in public spaces, state financing of faith schools, and tax relief for religious organisations suggest that this distinction is not particularly useful in easing the tension between liberal commitments to equality on the one hand, and freedom of religion on the other. This article deals with one aspect of this debate, which concerns whether members of religious communities should receive exemptions from regulations that place a distinctively heavy burden on them. Drawing on Habermas’ understanding of churches as ‘communities of interpretation’, we explore possible alternatives to both the ‘rule-and-exemption’ approach and the ‘neutralist’ approach. Our proposal rests on the idea of mutual learning between secular and religious perspectives. On this interpretation, what is required is (i) the generation and maintenance of public spaces in which there could be discussion and dialogue about particular cases, and (ii) evaluation of whether the basic conditions of moral discourse are present in these spaces. Thus deliberation becomes a touchstone for the building of a shared democratic ethos.
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Notes
We use the term ‘reformist’ because their proposals are intended to develop the ideals of membership and participation without relinquishing the core presumptions of liberal democracy. Thus, behind the shared commitment to reformism lie different political philosophical backgrounds, such as communitarianism or republicanism.
Some liberal authors have also recently drawn attention to the relevance of religion. In particular, Bou-Habib (2006) critically characterises religion as a ‘basic good’ or an ‘intense preference’. He argues that religious conduct can be a ‘derivative good’, with its value stemming from the integrity of the religious person. Liberal multiculturalism also concedes that some cultutal and religious exemptions are necessary in order to preserve other values such authonomy and equal respect. All these perspective register a tension between ‘public’ obligations and ‘private’ obligations deriving from religious membership.
See Noonan (2005, pp. 103–110) for an overview of the characteristics of a deliberative democracy rooted in discourse ethics.
This dichotomy between public and private spheres would be rejected both by defenders of religion in the public realm and by Habermas, through deliberative democracy, as we shall see later.
The reclusion of religion to the conscience of the believer was in fact a triumph of the Protestant Reformation, which decided, based on theses such as the free interpretation of the Scriptures, that the relation between God and man was a direct one, through one’s conscience, and not through an institution or hierarchy, as held by Catholicism.
Bader (1999, p. 602) expresses this idea forcefully: ‘The important thing, given the priority of democracy, should not be whether arguments are religious or secular but whether arguments, attitudes and practices are compatible with the principles, rights, culture, virtues, and good practices of social, democratic constitutionalism’.
We wish to insist that following this argument would in no way imply the claim that religious norms and traditions must be respected per se and that the State must abstain from interfering in all religious practices. Of course, some of these practices must be considered manifestations of freedom of conscience which may clash with other basic political rights, but both are relevant for citizens and it is difficult to prioritise one over the other (Weithman 1995, p. 32). Here it is crucial to distinguish between practices such as the consumption of peyote in some religious Amerindian ceremonies or the ritual sacrifice of animals, which pose no harm to other people, and practices which attack the dignity and basic rights of people. Religious practices which lead to domestic violence, genital mutilation, sexual abuse or collective suicide, for example, must be prohibited by the State. ‘Here, criminal law should step in: priority for liberal democracy must be strong enough to legitimize public scrutiny and interference to sanction these practices effectively’ (Bader 2003a, p. 277).
With the U principle, which establishes the conditions for discourse, one may distinguish norms which are morally valid, as each affected subject is obliged to accommodate himself to and understand the perspective of others before expressing his own interests. In other words, each must enter into dialogues whose objective is understanding and in which the participants take one another into consideration as valid interlocutors. Now, as we enter the territory of configuring a morally legitimate political space, one must take into account not only this principle, but also that in which juridical-political norms comply with the D principle. This then establishes that it is the actual participants in the discourse, those affected by the moral norm in question, who take on the role of protagonists through their active participation in the dialogue aimed at understanding. At the same time, one affirms that the types of reasons or judgements emitted are those which must be examined in each process of debate.
The error here lies in considering that any interest is true and valid simply by virtue of being ‘mine’ or ‘ours’. For both models of political philosophy, the interest is a given. They forget how these interests were constructed. However, as Mead affirms, any process of individuation is a process of socialisation (Habermas 1972, 1975). Therefore, if the interests have been socially, culturally, or religiously constructed, the political sphere ought to incorporate deliberation concerning them, given that politics is inherent in the processes through which these interests have been formed (Habermas 1996, 1998, pp. 239–264).
The republican concept of democracy is particularly vulnerable to this error, as it stems from the idea of a society which can self-organise as a whole. This overlooks the elements of social and cultural pluralism present in society, which ought to be seriously considered given that the interests and values intrinsic in such pluralism may conflict within the same community without any perspective for achieving consensus. One must not forget that the politically established right needs to be considered legitimate and ‘must be at least in harmony with moral principles that claim a general validity that extends beyond the limits of any legal community’ (Habermas 1998, p. 245).
It is important to mention here that his position had previously been ambivalent, vacillating and on occasions ambiguous with regard to the relation between religion and reason. See Habermas (1987).
Martha Minow too takes this line (2007, p. 825).
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Acknowledgements
This article draws on research carried out with the support of the EuroEthos Research Project Project, funded under the European Commission’s 6th Framework Programme. Thanks to two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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González, E., Lozano, J.F. & Pérez, P.J. Beyond the Conflict: Religion in the Public Sphere and Deliberative Democracy. Res Publica 15, 251–267 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-009-9093-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-009-9093-3