Abstract
In this commentary, after first summarizing the three major theses of Jeffrey's paper ‘Probability and Falsification: Critique of the Popper Program’, and sketching out what I take to be his central argument, I criticize Jeffrey on two grounds. The first is that he has failed to explain why his version of Bayesianism provides us with better theories upon which to make decisions; the second is that he has offered a theory about decision-making that by-passes the important question: How can we make more rational decisions?
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Goode, T.M. Comments on Richard Jeffrey. Synthese 30, 135–138 (1975). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485301
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485301