Journal of the History of Philosophy

Notes and Discussions A NOTE ON LOCKE'S THEORY OF SELF KNOWLEDGE One of the standard objections to I.x~cke's epistemology is that he is inconsistent when he claims that we have intuitive knowledge of the real existence of the self. He has defined intuitive knowledge of real existence as the immediate awareness of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, and in talking about intuitive knowledge of the self he must talk about the immediately perceived agreement of an idea with something which is not an idea. But such a criticism is too simplistic. 1 I show that this criticism is incorrect since Locke's distinction between adequate and inadequate ectypal ideas is not taken into account by the critics. His claim that we have intuitive knowledge of the real existence of the self is based on this distinction and by taking it into account the charge of inconsistency can be met. There are, however, difficulties with Locke's claim based on his distinctions between archetypal and ectypal ideas, and adequate and inadequate ectypal ideas. Locke distinguishes archetypal ideas which are not original patterns and not representations of something else from ectypal ideas which are copies or representations of something else. Ectypal ideas could be representations of substance or of the operations of the mind, or simply the copies of other ideas. A complex general idea is a nominal essence which is not a copy of any particular thing. Because general ideas are not copies of anything they are archetypal ideas. "The abstract idea for which the name stands, and the essence of the species, is one and the same.''2 "Every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence; and the names that stand for such distinct ideas are the names of things essentially different" (III, iii, 14). When an idea is archetypal, the real and nominal essences are identical (III, iii, 12). In certain cases such as simple ideas and modes and relations, the real and nominal essences are identical (III, iii, 18). Although for simple ideas and modes the real and nominal essences are the same, the real and nominal essences are always different for our ideas of substance (III, iii, 18). We can know the nominal essences of substances such as gold (the ectypal idea) but we cannot know the real essence (the archetype) of this substance . The nominal essence of gold is an abstract idea, whereas its real essence "is the real constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all of those properties.., which are to be found in it" (III, iii, 18). Locke is claiming here that in the case of material substance the real and nominal essences are distinct. In the case of substance, the abstract idea or nominal essence is an ectypal idea and there is no knowledge of the original archetype. However, the nominal essence or mental construct is an archetypal idea and is not a copy of some extra-mental thing in the case of general terms, abstract ideas, simple ideas and modes. We have corn1 D. J. O'Connor, 1ohn Locke (New York: Dover Publications, 1967), p. 163. W. T. Jones, Hobbes to Hume (New York: Harcourt, Brace &World, 1969),p. 253. 2 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, A. C. Fraser, ed. first edition, Oxford , 1894 (New York: Dover Publications, 1959),III, iii, 12. All further references are to this edition. [2,39] 240 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY plete knowledge about these archetypal ideas. There is no archetype or real essence which is hidden from us. We can have certain knowledge if the real and nominal essences are identical, i.e., if the ideas are archetypal and not ectypes or copies of some extra-mental archetype. But this certainty is a very limited form of certainty in that it only affords us knowledge about our own ideas. However, in Book Two Locke contradicts his claims in Book Three about the archetypal nature of simple ideas. In Book Two he says that simple ideas are ectypal (II, xxxi, 12). These simple ectypal ideas are the effects of the powers of substances. The powers are the archetypes of these simple ectypal ideas. This raises the problem about the degree...