Abstract
I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection and attention. I also argue that the representationalist model of choking is preferable, since some embodied actions require appeals to representations, something not available to Dreyfus's anti-representational model.
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Notes
In addition to Zahavi’s essay, see James Dow’s unpublished manuscript “Just Doing What I Do: Expert Bodily Action, Self-Consciousness and the Awareness of Agency”.
Anderson’s model has evolved over the years, although it has maintained its basic form. See Speelman and Kirsner (2005) for a review of Anderson’s most recent model, ACT-R and alternative models.
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I would like to thank Massimiliano Cappuccio, James Dow, Kristen Renzi, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments on the paper.
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Gottlieb, G. “Know-How, procedural knowledge, and choking under pressure”. Phenom Cogn Sci 14, 361–378 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9379-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9379-6