Abstract
Attempts to explicate the substance-property nexus are legion in the philosophical literature both historical and contemporary. In this paper, I shall attempt to impose some structure into the discussion by exploring ways to combine two unlikely bedfellows—Platonic properties and Aristotelian substances. Special attention is paid to the logical structure of substances and the metaphysics of property exemplification. I shall argue that an Aristotelian-Platonic account of the substance-property nexus is possible and has been ably defended by contemporary philosophers.
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Notes
Why assume properties are Platonic rather than Aristotelian? Without apology, I am a Platonist. Hence, as a Platonist, I am interested in exploring the ways that Platonic properties (some of them no doubt are universals such as being white, others perhaps are singularities such as being identical to Socrates) are had by substances. Arguments in favor of a Platonic conception of properties typically involve appeals to, inter alia, (a) the abstract nature of properties; (b) the necessary existence of properties; and (c) the possibility or reality of unexemplified properties. For further discussion of some of the common motivations in favor of a Platonic conception of properties, see Oliver (1996:27–28).
For further discussion on this topic, see Newman (1992:165–168).
For an interesting paper challenging these assumptions, see MacBride (2005).
So, substances are natural unities and fundamental unities.
This non-reductive account of substance avoids many difficulties and confusions that arise when engaging in “bottom-up” ontological analysis, where a substance is characterized solely in terms of its parts. To sight one recent example of such metaphysical confusion, see Benovsky (2008) where he repeatedly confuses the unifying role of a substratum (i.e., a bare particular) with the individuating role. On the Aristotelian view articulated here, the substance (at the level of the whole) plays the unifying role, and constituent parts (inter alia, properties, exemplification relationships, bare particulars) play other roles.
Bergmann and Brower (2006: 368–369).
Just what metaphysical explanation amounts to is difficult to spell out apart from citing examples. What I hope to make clear in the above examples is that, whatever it is, metaphysical explanation is not causal explanation (or if it is a kind of Aristotelian cause, it is a different sense than final causation). Minimally, a metaphysical explanation seeks to provide an account of metaphysical facts such as resemblance, talk of sameness of kind, the application of one predicate to an indefinite multitude of individuals, and so on.
In general, according to Schnieder, statements involving complex or elaborated concepts (i.e., colored, brother-in-law) are explained by recourse to more primitive concepts (i.e., red, married, sister). See Schnieder (2006:33).
By e.g., Moreland and Rae (2000: 71).
Connell (1988: 89–92).
This discussion of bare substrata is distinct from the notion of bare particular to be shortly discussed when considering J.P. Moreland’s Aristotelian substance account.
Loux is quick to point out, however, that Aristotle doesn’t always appear consistent on this point. In a footnote immediately following the above quoted passage, Loux states “See e.g., Categories 5 as well as Metaphysics Z and H passim. But while much that Aristotle says about substance points in the direction of this sort of anti-reductionistic view, his doctrine of the hylomorphic structure of substance frequently leads him to make claims that are (at least apparently) opposed to a holistic account of substance” (ibid. 179).
Witness e.g., Plantinga (1974) where his freewill defense and modalized ontological argument utilize Platonic properties—individual essences, maximal greatness, and more—on almost every page.
I suppose we could also call it a kind of causal explanation. Still, it would be a different kind of causal explanation. On the Aristotelian terminology, F is the formal cause of x’s being F.
From Barnes (1984).
Loux (2006a: 207, footnote 2).
The following characterization of constituent and relational ontologies is from Smith (1997: 106–107). Smith’s characterization as quoted above is (said by Smith to be taken) from Alfred J. Freddoso, “Introduction to Ontology” lecture notes, Notre Dame University. Cf. also Newman (1992: 2) where he gives the same (basic) characterization of constituent and relational ontologies in terms of immanent realism (i.e., Aristotelianism) and transcendent realism (i.e., Platonism).
See Bergmann (1967), Armstrong (1989), Newman (1992), Moreland (2001), and Smith (1997). Of course, the devil is in the details. Bergmann and Armstrong might wince at the above characterization of a constituent ontology, arguing instead that it is the category of fact or states of affairs that are the wholes so constituted. Whether states of affairs and facts are best understood as abstract entities or concrete structures is a hotly debated issue. One relevant issue is whether or not, given actualism, the concrete states of affairs view can accommodate the existence of nonobtaining but possible states of affairs. For an argument that they do not, see Plantinga (1983); for an argument that they do, see Wetzel (1998). Here, we shall not have to decide on this issue, since I will treat substances, not facts or states of affairs, as the possessor of properties on the constituent approach.
See Loux (2006a: 209) for a brief discussion of the category mistake objection. Basically, the idea is that abstract objects cannot coherently be construed as constituents, components, or ingredients of concrete particulars.
Armstrong (1989: 96–97). He suggest that in order to avoid the temptation to believe in unexemplified universals, we ought to think of properties as “ways things are” instead of “things” that can enjoy separate existence apart from concrete particulars.
Thus, a single-style approach to property possession for each kind of entity is preferable. Still, it could be the case that different kinds of entities admit different approaches to property possession. For example, it is reasonable to think that properties, numbers, and other abstracta possess properties in the relational way, even if e.g., substances possess properties in the constituent way.
As Loux does in (2006a: 209).
As Aristotle argues against Plato (who separated the Forms from their instances) in Metaphysics, 1079b11–1080a10.
Armstrong wrongly assumes that all Platonist theories are relational theories (as his metaphor of particulars as bloblike suggests).
Loux (2006a: 237–238) makes both of these points.
Examples of pure properties are being red or being human, contrasted with impure, or relational, properties such as being identical to Socrates or being to the left of Mary. Loux rules out impure properties since they “incorporate determinate particulars and so they cannot be numbered among the ‘building blocks’ out of which particular substances are constituted.” Ibid., 133.
Loux makes the distinction between property universals and substance-kind universals, and argues that the latter are not properties. He is using a different sense of ‘property’ than the one I employee in this paper. For Loux, a property is a necessarily existing abstract object that does not explain the particularity of the object that possesses it and a substance-kind is a necessarily existing abstract object that does. I say both are Platonic properties as I use the term (i.e., an abstract necessarily existing entity that explains the character of the thing that has it). Loux does postulate at least two kinds of Platonic properties however.
Hence the title of his article, “How to be a nominalist in realist clothing.” .
See Moreland and Pickavance (2003).
Moreland’s account of substance as diagrammed here had to be reconstructed from his writing’s on the topic over roughly a 10-year period (1991–2001, see bibliography). His account of property exemplification and substance shifted subtly over this decade, and I have confirmed through personal email correspondence (dated 8/16/10) that the following characterization does in fact represent accurately Moreland’s considered views on the topic.
Moreland (2001: 99). In order to avoid Bradley regress worries, Moreland thinks of relations as “the sort of things that do not need to be related to their relata before they can relate those relata to each other….As a primitive metaphysical fact, exemplification is an unmediated linker of properties to other properties or particulars” (ibid. 116).
Thus, in Chisholm’s familiar style, it is true in a “loose and popular” sense that Socrates exemplifies whiteness (for example), but false in a “technical or philosophical” sense since it is the individuator that is the literal exemplifier of properties.
For a good summary of Moreland’s broadly Aristotelian account of substance, see (ibid. 70–85).
I say at least two relations, since I am primarily concerned with properties as diagrammed above. I will leave it as an open question as to whether there are other internal relations that connect other metaphysical parts within a substance. Note, for Moreland, that the notion of ‘constituent’ “ranges over parts, separable and inseparable (e.g., Husserlian moments), properties, internal relations within some whole, and, indeed, all entities whatsoever that enter into the being of some whole” (2001: 142).
Moreland states, “It is widely recognized that when a universal is exemplified by a particular, the resulting state of affairs (the having of the universal by the particular) is itself a particular. This has been called the victory of particularity” (2001: 63). Thus, Moreland endorses the following (reasonable) principle: any substance that has as a constituent a concrete (metaphysical or physical) part is itself concrete.
Of course, if the substance in question is non-spatial, then the quality instance will be non-spatial as well.
After a lengthy argument against Wolterstorff and Armstrong, Moreland states: “If one accepts a realist construal of properties, then one must also embrace some type of individuator that is not a normal property (e.g., an impure property) or is not a property at all, or else the position collapses into moderate nominalism [as Moreland claims Wolterstorff and Armstrong’s accounts do]” (2001: 94–95). See also Moreland (1991).
Quoted in Newman (1992: 4).
It is often said that the constituent ontologist must deny the fact that there are necessary truths about universals. Since (setting God aside) there are no necessary individuals, it follows that there are no necessary properties as well. All properties exist contingently in contingent substances. Hence, “Truths about colors, triangles and numbers are thus contingent also (this is plainly a bullet which all constituent ontologist must bite, and without compunction)” says Barry Smith (2006: 110). Not so for the constituent ontologist who is a Platonist regarding properties. She can happily affirm necessary truths about properties since they too exist necessarily (and hence, ground the truth of singular propositions about them). This is an additional benefit to the constituent approach for the Platonist.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to J.P. Moreland and Javier Cumpa for many insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Gould, P. How Does an Aristotelian Substance Have its Platonic Properties? Issues and Options. Axiomathes 23, 343–364 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-011-9147-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-011-9147-y