Abstract
In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine grainess of non-conceptual contents while having conceptual structure. In what follows I will argue that, first, that the notion of demonstrative concept is not viable and, second, that there is an epistemological role for non-conceptual content.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
All the most important papers relevant for this debate have been re-published in Gunther (2003) with new interesting additions. A very useful survey of the whole debate is Toribio (2007). An interesting side aspect of this debate concerns the notion of subdoxastic state, for which see Stich (1978), Davies (1989). Stalnaker (1998) it is a useful starting point as well.
This is not surprising, in a way, because the relation between coarse-grained and fine-grained concepts is asymmetrical. If something falls within the extension of a fine grained concept ‘thatRed shade’ then it falls within the extension of one C-concept, for example C-red, but not the converse, given the coarse grainess of C-concepts. However, and here is the problem we just mentioned. So the very same shade that falls within the demonstrative concept ‘thatRed shade’ could fall within the extension of another C-concept, for instance C-purple.
This is the subject of Peacocke (2001) where he somewhat concedes that a non-conceptual content could provide a reason for a subject’s empirical beliefs provided that the subject can recognize such a role at the conceptual level. On this see McFarland (1998) and Millar (1991). On the general tenability of this argument see Taylor (1978–1979).
Kelly (2001b) has also argued that fine grainess is not that relevant for settling the issue. I leave this problem aside.
References
Brewer B (1999) Perception and reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Brewer B (2005) Perceptual experience has conceptual content. In: Sosa E, Steup M (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Oxford, Blackwell, pp 217–230
Bermudez JL (1994) Peacocke’s argument against the autonomy of nonconceptual representational content. Mind Lang 9:402–418
Bermudez JL (1995) Nonconceptual content. Mind Lang 10:333–369
Bermudez JL, McPherson F (1998) Nonconceptual content and the nature of perceptual experience. Electronic J Analytic Philos 6:1–12
Collins A (1998) Beastly experience. Philos Phenomen Res 58:375–380
Crane T (1992) The nonconceptual content of experience. In: Crane T (ed) The contents of experience. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 136–157
Cussins A (1990) The connectionist construction of concepts. In: Boden M (ed) The philosophy of artificial intelligence. Oxford University Press, pp 368–440
Davies M. (1989) Tacit knowledge and subdoxastic states. In: George A (eds) Reflections on chomsky. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 131–151
Evans G (1982) The varieties of reference. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gunther Y (eds) (2003) Essays on nonconceptual content. Mit Press, Cambridge
Hamlyn D (1994) Perception, sensation, and non-conceptual content. Philos Q 44:139–153
Kelly S (2001a) Demonstrative concepts and experience. Philos Rev 110:397–420
Kelly S (2001b) The non-conceptual content of perceptual experience: situation dependence and fineness of grain. Philos Phenomen Res 62:601–608
McDowell J (1994) Mind and world. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
McFarland D (1998) Crane on concepts and experiential content. Analysis 58:54–58
McGinn C (1989) Mental content. Blackwell, Oxford
Millar A (1991) Concepts, experience and inference. Mind C4:495–505
Noë A (2005) Anti-intellectualism. Analysis 65:278–289
Peacocke C (1992) A study of concepts. Mit Press, Cambridge
Peacocke C (1994) Non-conceptual content: kinds, rationales and relations. Mind Lang 9:418–428
Peacocke C (2001) Does perception have a nonconceptual content? J Philos 98:239–264
Stalnaker R (1998) What might nonconceptual content be? In Villanueva E (ed) Philos Issues 9:339–352
Stich S (1978) Beliefs and subdoxastic states. Philos Sci 45:499–518
Taylor C (1978–1979) The validity of transcendental arguments. P Aristotelian Soc LXXIX:151–165
Toribio J (2007) Nonconceptual content. Philos Compass 2(3):445–460
Acknowledgements
A version of this paper has been read at the Fourth Congress of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy held in Lund, Sweden, in June 2002. I wish to thanks the audience for comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gozzano, S. In Defence of Non-conceptual Content. Axiomathes 18, 117–126 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-007-9024-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-007-9024-x