Abstract
One of the principal difficulties in assessing Science as aProcess (Hull 1988) is determining the relationship between the various elements of Hull's theory. In particular, it is hard to understand precisely how conceptual selection is related to Hull's account of the social dynamics of science. This essay aims to clarify the relation between these aspects of his theory by examining his discussion of the``demic structure'' of science. I conclude that the social account cando significant explanatory work independently of the selectionistaccount. Further, I maintain that Hull's treatment of the demicstructure of science points us toward an important set of issues insocial epistemology. If my reading of Science as a Process iscorrect, then most of Hull's critics (e.g., those who focus solelyon his account of conceptual selection) have ignored promisingaspects of his theory.
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Grantham, T.A. Evolutionary Epistemology, Social Epistemology, and the Demic Structure of Science. Biology & Philosophy 15, 443–463 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006718131883
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006718131883