Abstract
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent.
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Grant, S., Kajii, A. & Polak, B. Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency. Theory and Decision 48, 263–286 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005298409014
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005298409014