Abstract
One of the central problems of personal identity is to determine what we are essentially. In response to this problem, Lynne Rudder Baker espouses a psychological criterion, that is, she claims that persons are essentially psychological. Baker’s theory purports to bypass the problems of other psychological theories such as Dissociative Identity Disorder and the problem of individuating persons synchronically. I argue that the theory’s treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder leads to untenable results, is invalid, and consequently fails to individuate persons.
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Notes
While the constitution view primarily addresses the second question, it has immediate bearing on the first as well. Baker holds that personal identity over time is sameness of first-person perspective over time. See Chap. 5 of Baker (2000).
This thought—that it is prima facie possible for multiple persons to exist in one human body (according to psychological theories of personal identity)—is a preponderant view among philosophers (e.g., Baker 2000; and Nicholas Humphrey and Daniel Dennett 1989). (I say “prima facie possible” because many philosophers, including Baker, argue that multiple persons existing in one human body is impossible according to their psychological theory of personal identity.) Throughout the paper, I assume this prima facie possibility and that DID supports it. However, I should note that this assumption is controversial. For example, Jeanette Kennett and Steve Matthews argue that modern cases of DID (one of the main reasons for believing this prima facie possibility) can be explained by appealing to different disorders rather than explaining DID by way of multiple persons and that the burden of proof should be on those who support the “multiple persons existing in one body” thesis (2003).
I do not mean to suggest that Olson is correct; I mention his argument simply to support my claim that, if psychological theories of personal identity—including Baker’s theory—hold that more than one person can exist in one human body, then the theories must overcome challenging arguments. I should mention, however, that, as of now, neurological studies do not seem to provide strong evidence against Olson’s argument. To asses Olson’s argument, it seems that we would need to determine whether significant neurological differences correlate with different personality states. That is, if the psychological personal identity theorist holds that the different personalities in DID are different persons, we would expect significant neurological changes among the different personalities. Some studies find, for example, that SPECT imaging of the brain shows no significant changes in regional cerebral blood flow between different personalities of DID patients (Vedat Sar et al. 2001). Others find significant differences, e.g., differences in EEG (Annedore Hopper et al. 2002; and A. R., Lapointe et al. 2006), between personalities. To my knowledge, there is no conclusive evidence to support the hypothesis that multiple persons can supervene on changes in the same brain (corresponding with different personalities) since inter alia it is unclear how significant a neurological difference must be (and what kind of difference must take place) to support the hypothesis. It seems that Olson’s argument poses at least a prima facie challenge.
Baker states that the other problem of individuation is diachronic identity.
It is unclear whether Baker thinks that every time we think, we use FPP. Thus, this point may be controversial, but the fact that those sleeping or in a coma do not think using FPP, is not.
Persons are not necessarily human. It just happens that we are constituted by human bodies, but persons could be constituted by machinery, other biological organisms, etc. For example, a human person’s parts could be slowly replaced with bionic parts; it would remain a person but not a human. However, if x is a human person, x is essentially embodied, i.e., x must be constituted by some material thing. See for example, Baker (2000, 92–93 and 107).
See also, Baker (2000, 31).
Constitution is a relation between individual entities, not properties. See Baker (2000, 33–34).
For example, the statue of David needs inter alia an art world to come into existence. Likewise, for a human animal to constitute a person, conditions conducive to the development and maintenance of a FPP—circumstances such as normal brain development—are necessary.
For a more detailed account of derivate and nonderivative properties, see Chap. 2 of Baker (2000).
Baker’s analysis of diachronic identity relies heavily upon this fact, that is, the fact that persons are defined in terms of having a FPP essentially. Baker claims that “person P1 at t 1 is the same person as person P2 at t 2 if and only if P1 and P2 have the same first-person perspective” (2000, 132).
Although Baker explicitly uses “physically possible,” I will also examine “capacity” for a more charitable interpretation since many of her claims lead me to believe that she means “capacity.” For example, she defines a human person as “having the capacity for a FPP essentially.”
It may also have the result that those in a coma, sleeping, among others, are not human persons. However, it is a stronger claim that, e.g., the bodies of those in a coma are incapable of expressing their intentional states. I will not argue for this stronger claim since holding that the completely paralyzed are not human persons is enough to show that Baker’s analysis has untenable results.
The context I consider is “narrow” in that it only considers a few facts. In many of Lewis’s examples, the more facts we consider, the less capable something becomes. This is the case with the completely paralyzed; if we add, e.g., the fact that the completely paralyzed do not express intentional states, this would seem to make the completely paralyzed incapable of expressing intentional states. Thus, I believe that using a “narrow” context strengthens my argument.
According to the “capacity” interpretation of “physically possible.”
It is not often thought that true statements entail possible statements. Thus, even if it is true that a human body cannot express contrary intentional states at the same time, it does not follow that it is impossible.
A disanalogy could be that the partially paralyzed side of the body may perspire, which may indicate physical effort; however, we can assume that the effort has just begun so perspiration has not begun. Another disanalogy is that being paralyzed is not identical with total relaxation [however, since a body’s intentional states must be sensed to be known, and since a totally relaxed body (e.g., sleeping) may look, feel, etc., the same as a totally paralyzed body, it is unclear whether we could always tell the difference]. My point is simply to provide a close example to demonstrate a general point: different parts of the numerically same body can, and do, express different intentional states (including the extremely different, perhaps contradictory, intentional states that Baker envisages). This general point shows that it is possible for the numerically same body to express both enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time.
It may be physically impossible for a part of the body, e.g., an eye, to express contradictory intentional states at the same time; however, this does not show that an entire human body cannot express contradictory intentional states at the same time: different parts of the body can express contradictory intentional states at one time.
An anonymous referee suggested this possible reply to me.
That is, I argue that we have good reasons to doubt premise (2), but the possible response to my argument could be defended even though I have given reasons to doubt it. Since Baker says little about intentions, it is open to her to argue that, e.g., writing a paper and planning to complete it, are not intentions, or that it is possible for an entire body to express these intentions (although I cannot imagine how the latter argument would go).
For example, see Wilkes (1981).
I am indebted to anonymous referee for this point.
I have added the parenthetical remarks in order to generalize Baker’s premise (2). I do this to show that regardless of whether we use Baker’s formulation of premise (2) or generalize premise (2), an inconsistent triad is formed.
Note that the parenthetical generalized version of (3) is inconsistent with (1) ([2] is unnecessary).
References
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Robert Francescotti, Liana Greetis, and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments.
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Greetis, E.A. Dissociative Identity: An Objection to Baker’s Constitution Theory. Acta Anal 26, 329–341 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0133-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0133-1