REFERENCES
Bach, K. (1994): ‘Conversational Impliciture’, Mind and Language 9, 124–162.
Barwise, J. and Perry, J. (1981): ‘Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6, 387–403.
Barwise, J. and Perry, J. (1983): Situations and Attitudes, MIT: Bradford.
Bealer, G. (1982): Quality and Concept, Oxford: Clarendon.
Berg, J. (1988): ‘The Pragmatics of Substitutivity’, Linguistics and Philosophy 11, 355–370.
Carston, R. (1988): ‘Implicature, Explicature, and Truth-Theoretic Semantics’, in R. Kempson (ed.), Mental Representations: The Interface Between Language and Reality, pp. 155–181, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cohen, L. J. (1971): ‘Some Remarks on Grice's Views About the Logical Particles of Natural Language’, in Y. Bar-Hillel (ed.), Pragmatics of Natural Language, pp. 50–68, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Crimmins, M. (1992): Talk About Beliefs, MIT: Bradford.
Green, M. (1995): ‘Quantity, Volubility, and Some Varieties of Discourse’, Linguistics and Philosophy 18, 83–112.
Green, M. (1997): ‘On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning’, to appear in Mind 106.
Green, M. (ms): ‘Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content’.
Grice, H. P. (1975): ‘Logic and Conversation’, in his (1989), pp. 1–144.
Grice, H. P. (1989): Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard.
Hirschberg (1985): A Theory of Scalar Implicature, Dissertation, Department of Computer Science, University of Pennsylvania.
Horn, L. (1989): A Natural History of Negation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hornsby, J. (1977): ‘Singular Terms in the Context of Propositional Attitude’, Mind 86, 31–48.
Kripke, S. (1972): Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kripke, S. (1979): ‘A Puzzle About Belief’, in Salmon and Soames (1988), pp. 102–148.
Levinson, S. (1983): Pragmatics, Cambridge: C. U. P.
Martinich, A. P. (1980): ‘Conversational Maxims and Some Philosophical Problems’, The Philosophical Quarterly 30, 215–228.
McKay, T. (1981): ‘On Proper Names in Belief Ascriptions’, Philosophical Studies 39, 287–303.
Peacocke, C. (1975): ‘Proper Names, Reference, and Rigid Designation’, in S. Blackburn (ed.), Meaning, Reference and Necessity, Cambridge: C. U. P.
Quine, W. (1956): ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, Journal of Philosophy 53, 177–187.
Recanati, F. (1989): ‘The Pragmatics of What Is Said’, Mind and Language 4, 295–329.
Recanati, F. (1993): Direct Reference: From Language to Thought, Oxford: Blackwell.
Richard, M. (1983): ‘Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 12, 425–452.
Richard, M. (1987): ‘Attitude Ascriptions, Semantic Theory and Pragmatic Evidence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87, 243–262.
Richard, M. (1990): Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them, Cambridge: C. U. P.
Sainsbury, M. (1983): ‘On a Fregean Argument for the Distinctness of Sense and Reference’, Analysis 43, 12–14.
Salmon, N. (1986): Frege's Puzzle, MIT: Bradford.
Salmon, N. (1989a): ‘Illogical belief’, in Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, pp. 243–286, Atascadero: Ridgeview.
Salmon, N. (1989b): ‘Reference and Information Content: Names and Descriptions’, in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, IV: Topics in the Philosophy of Language, pp. 409–462, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Salmon, N. (1989c): ‘How to Become a Millian Heir’, Noûs 23, 211–220.
Salmon, N. (1990): ‘A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn’, in C. A. Anderson and J. Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language and Mind, pp. 215–248, Palo Alto: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Salmon, N. (1995): ‘Being of Two Minds: Belief Without Doubt’, Noûs 29, 1–20.
Schiffer, S. (1987): ‘The ‘Fido’-Fido Theory of Belief’, in Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives Vol 1: Metaphysics, pp. 464–480, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
Soames, S. (1987): ‘Substitutivity’, in On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright, pp. 99–132, M. I. T.: Bradford.
Soames, S. (1988): ‘Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content’, in N. Salmon and S. Soames (eds.), Propositions and Attitudes, pp. 197–239, Oxford: O. U. P.
Tye, M. (1978): ‘The Puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56, 219–224.
Urmson, J. O. (1968): ‘Criteria of Intensionality (Symposium with L. J. Cohen)’, Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Supplementary Volume 42, 107–122.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Green, M.S. Direct Reference and Implicature. Philosophical Studies 91, 61–90 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004212614842
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004212614842